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Abstract. How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer
this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of
problems, including traffic routing. Within this context, a methodology for designing tolling mechanisms
that minimize the system inefficiency (price of anarchy) exploiting solely local information is so far miss-
ing in spite of the scientific interest. In this manuscript we resolve this problem through a tractable linear
programming formulation that applies to and beyond polynomial congestion games. When specializing our
approach to the polynomial case, we obtain tight values for the optimal price of anarchy and corresponding
tolls, uncovering an unexpected link with load balancing games. We also derive optimal tolling mechanisms
that are constant with the congestion level, generalizing the results of [8] to polynomial congestion games
and beyond. Finally, we apply our techniques to compute the efficiency of the marginal cost mechanism.
Surprisingly, optimal tolling mechanism using only local information perform closely to existing mecha-
nism that utilize global information [6], while the marginal cost mechanism, known to be optimal in the
continuous-flow model, has lower efficiency than that encountered levying no toll. All results are tight for
pure Nash equilibria, and extend to coarse correlated equilibria.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Congestion games, taxation mechanisms, price of anarchy, Nash equilib-
rium, coarse correlated equilibrium, selfish routing, approximation algorithms.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern society is based on large-scale systems often at the service of end-users, e.g., transporta-
tion and communication networks. As the performance of such systems heavily depends on the
interaction between the users’ individual behaviour and the underlying infrastructure (e.g., drivers
on a road-traffic network), the operation of such systems requires interdisciplinary considerations
at the confluence between economics, engineering, and computer science.
A common issue arising in these settings is the performance degradation incurred when the users’
individual objectives are not aligned to the “greater good”. Within the environmental sciences this
phenomenon has been extensively studied, and, in its extreme form, is referred to as the “tragedy of
the commons” [16]. A prime example of how users’ behaviour degrades the performance is provided
by road-traffic routing: when drivers choose routes that minimize their individual travel time, the
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aggregate congestion could be much higher compared to that of a centrally-imposed routing. A
fruitful paradigm to tackle this issue is to employ appropriately designed tolling mechanisms, as
widely acknowledged in the economic and computer science literature [23, 27, 38].
Pursuing a similar line of research, this manuscript centers around the design of tolling mecha-
nisms that maximize the system efficiency associated to self-interested decision making (i.e., that
minimize the price of anarchy [22]). Our work focuses on the well-studied class of atomic congestion
games, most notably utilized to model selfish routing through a congestion-sensitive network [28].
Within this context, we develop a methodology to compute the most efficient local tolling mecha-
nism, i.e., the most efficient mechanism whose tolls levied on each resource depend only on the local
properties of that resource. We do so for both the congestion-aware and congestion-independent
settings, whereby tolls have or do not have access to the current congestion levels. A summary
of our results, including a comparison with the literature, can be found in Table 1. Surprisingly,
optimal local tolls perform closely to existing tolls designed using global information [6].
1.1 Congestion games, local and global mechanisms
Congestion gameswere introduced in 1973 by Rosenthal [33], and since then have found applications
in diverse fields, such as energy markets [31], machine scheduling [36], wireless data networks
[37], sensor allocation [24], network design [2], and many more. While our results can be applied
to a variety of problems, we consider traffic routing as our prime application. In a congestion game,
we are given a set of users N = {1, . . . ,n}, and a set of resources E. Each user can choose a subset
of the set of resources which she intends to use. We list all feasible choices for user i ∈ N in the
set Ai ⊆ 2E . The cost for using each resource e ∈ E depends only on the total number of users
concurrently selecting that resource, and is denoted with ℓe : N→ R≥0. Once all users have made a
choice ai ∈ Ai , each user incurs a cost obtained by summing the costs of all resources she selected.
Finally, the system cost represents the cost incurred by all users
SC(a) =
∑
e ∈E
|a |eℓe (|a |e ), (1)
where |a |e is the number of users selecting resource e in allocation a = (a1, . . . ,an). We denote
with G the set containing all congestion games with a maximum of n agents, and where all resource
costs {ℓe }e ∈E belong to a common set of functions L.
Local and global tolling mechanisms. We assume users to be self-interested, and observe that self-
interested decisionmaking often results in a highly suboptimal system cost [32]. Consequently, there
has been considerable interest in the application of tolling mechanisms to influence the resulting
outcome [5, 6, 8, 14, 19, 26]. Formally, a tolling mechanism T : G × e 7→ τe is a map that associates
an instance G ∈ G and a resource e ∈ E to the corresponding toll τe . Here τe : {1, . . . ,n} → R is a
congestion-dependent toll, i.e., τe maps the number of users in resource e to the corresponding toll.
As a result, user i ∈ N incurs a cost factoring both the cost of the resources and the tolls, i.e.,
Ci (a) =
∑
e ∈ai
ℓe (|a |e ) + τe (|a |e ). (2)
Designing tolling mechanisms that utilize global information (such as knowledge of all resource
costs, or knowledge of the feasible sets {Ai }ni=1) is often difficult, as that might require the central
planner to access private users information, in addition to the associated computational burden.
Within the context of traffic routing (see Example 1.1 below), a global mechanism might produce a
toll on edge e that depends on the structure of the network, on the travel time over all edges, as
well as on the exact origin and destination of every user. On the contrary, local tolling mechanisms
require much less information, are scalable, accommodate resources that are dynamically added or
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removed, and are robust against a number of variations, e.g., the common scenario where drivers
modify their destination. Therefore, a significant portion of the literature has focused on designing
tolls that exploit only local information. Formally, we say that a tolling mechanism T is local if the
toll on each resource only uses information on the cost function ℓe of the same resource e , and
no other information. If this is the case, we write τe = T (ℓe ) with slight abuse of notation. On the
contrary, if the mechanism utilizes additional information on the instance, we say it is global.
Example 1.1 (traffic routing). Within the context of traffic routing, E represents the set of edges
defining the underlying road network over which users wish to travel. For this purpose, each user
i ∈ N can select any path connecting her origin to her destination node, thus producing a list of
feasible paths Ai . The travel time incurred by a user transiting on edge e ∈ E is captured by the
function ℓe , and depends only on the number of users traveling through that very edge. In this
context, the function ℓe takes into consideration geometric properties of the edge, such as its length,
the number of lanes and speed limit [39]. The system cost in (1) represents the time spent on the
network by all users, whereas tolls are imposed on the edges to incentivize users in selecting paths
that minimize the total travel time (1).
1.2 Performance metrics
The performance of a tolling mechanism is typically measured by the ratio between the system
cost incurred at the worst-performing emergent allocation and the minimum system cost. As users
are assumed to be self-interested, the emergent allocation is described by any of the following
equilibrium notions: pure or mixed Nash equilibrium, correlated or coarse correlated equilibrium –
each being a superset of the previous [34].1 When considering pure Nash equilibria, the performance
metric of a mechanism T , referred to as the price of anarchy [22], is defined as
PoA(T ) = sup
G ∈G
NECost(G,T )
MinCost(G) , (3)
where MinCost(G) is the minimum social cost for instance G as defined in (1), and NECost(G,T )
denotes the highest social cost at a Nash equilibrium obtained when employing the mechanism T
on the game G. Similarly, it is possible to define the price of anarchy for mixed Nash, correlated
and coarse correlated equilibria. While these different metrics need not be equal in general, they do
coincide within the setting of interest to this manuscript, as we will later clarify. Therefore, in the fol-
lowing, we will use PoA(T ) to refer to the efficiency values of any and all these equilibrium classes.
1.3 Related Work
The scientific interest in the design of tolls dates back to the early 1900s [32]. Since then, a large body
of literature in the areas of transportation, economics, and computer science has investigated this
approach [5, 14, 19, 26]. Designing tolling mechanisms that optimize the efficiency is particularly
challenging in the context of (atomic) congestion games, as observed, e.g., by [17], in part due to
the multiplicity of the equilibria. While most of the research [1, 3, 13, 34] has focused on providing
efficiency bounds for given schemes or in the un-tolled case, much less is known regarding the
design question. Owing to the technical difficulties, only partial results are available for global tolling
mechanisms [6, 8, 15], while results for local tolling mechanisms are limited to affine congestion
games [8], to the best of our knowledge.
Reference [8] initiated the study of tolling mechanisms in the context of congestion games,
restricting their attention to affine resource costs. Relative to this setting, they show how to
1For a congestion game, existence of pure Nash equilibria (and thus of all other equilibrium notions mentioned above) is
guaranteed even in the presence of tolls, due to the fact that the resulting game is potential.
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compute a congestion-independent global toll yielding a (tight) price of anarchy of 2 for mixed
Nash equilibria, in addition to a congestion-independent local toll yielding a (tight) price of anarchy
of 1 + 2/√3 ≈ 2.155 for pure Nash equilibria. Our result pertaining to the design of optimal
congestion-independent local tolls generalizes this finding to any polynomial (and non polynomial)
congestion game and holds tightly for both pure Nash and coarse correlated equilibria.
More recently [6] studies congestion-dependent global tolls for pure Nash and coarse correlated
equilibria, in addition to one-round walks from the empty state. Relative to unweighted congestion
games, they derive tolling mechanisms yielding a price of anarchy for coarse correlated equilibria
equal to 2 for affine resource costs; and similarly for higher order polynomials. While the latter
work provides a number of interesting insights (e.g., some closed form price of anarchy expressions),
all the derived tolling schemes require global information such as network and user knowledge - an
often impractical scenario in the context of traffic routing. In contrast, our results on optimal local
tolls focuses on the design of optimal mechanisms that exploit local information only, and thus
are more widely applicable. Even if utilizing much less information, optimal local mechanisms are
still competitive. For example, we derive congestion-dependent optimal local tolls yielding a price
of anarchy of 2.012 for coarse correlated equilibria and affine congestion games (to be compared
with a value of 2 mentioned above).
Related works have also explored modifications of the setup considered here: [8] also studies
tolling for singleton congestion games, [15] focuses on symmetric network congestion games, while
[18, 20, 21] study the problem of tolling a subset of the resources. Preprint [35] focuses primarily on
the computation of approximate Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games. Therein, the authors
design modified latency functions leveraging a methodology similar to that developed in [9, 12, 29].
Finally, we note that the design of tolling mechanisms is far better understood when the original
congestion game is replaced by its continuous-flow approximation, as uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed. Limited to this approximate setting, marginal cost tolls produce an equi-
libriumwhich is always optimal [4].Within the atomic setting, our work demonstrates that marginal
cost tolls do not improve - and instead significantly deteriorate - the resulting system efficiency.
1.4 Preview of Our Contributions
The core of our work is centered on designing optimal local tolling mechanisms and on deriving
their corresponding prices of anarchy for various classes of congestion games. Our work develops
on parallel directions, and the contributions include the following:
i) The design of optimal local tolling mechanisms;
ii) The design of optimal congestion-independent local tolling mechanisms;
iii) The study of marginal cost tolls and their inefficiency.
Table 1 highlights the impact of our results on congestion games with polynomial cost functions of
varying degree, though our methodology extends further. The following paragraphs describe our
contributions in further details, while supporting Python and Matlab code can be found in [10].
Optimal local tolls. In Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 we provide a methodology for computing optimal
local tolling mechanisms for congestion games. The resulting price of anarchy values for the case
of polynomial congestion games are presented in Table 1 (fourth column), where we provide a
comparisonwith those derived in [6, 8] (third column), which insteadmake use of global information,
for example, by letting the tolling function on edge e depend on the latency functions on all the
other edges. Surprisingly, the efficiency of optimal tolls designed using only local information is
almost identical to that of existing tolls designed using global information [6, 8]. In addition to
providing similar performances by means of less information, local tolls are robust against uncertain
scenarios (e.g., modifications in the origin/destination pairs) and can be computed efficiently.
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d No toll Global toll Optimal local toll Optimal constant local toll Marginal cost toll
[1] from [6, 8] (this work) (this work) (this work)
1 2.50 2 2.012 2.15 3.00
2 9.58 5 5.101 5.33 13.00
3 41.54 15 15.551 18.36 57.36
4 267.64 52 55.452 89.41 391.00
5 1513.57 203 220.401 469.74 2124.21
6 12 345.20 877 967.533 3325.58 21 337.00
Table 1. Price of anarchy values for congestion games with resource costs of degree at most d . All results are
tight for pure Nash and also hold for coarse correlated equilibria. The columns feature the price of anarchy
with no tolls, with global tolls from [6, 8], with optimal local tolls, with optimal constant (i.e. congestion-
independent) local tolls, and with marginal cost tolls, respectively. Columns four, five, and six, are composed of
entirely novel results, except for the case of constant tolls with d = 1, which recovers [8]. Note that i) optimal
tolls relying only on local information perform closely to optimal tolls designed using global information, with
a difference in performance below 1% for d = 1; ii) congestion-independent tolls result in a price of anarchy
that is comparable to that obtained using congestion-aware local tolls for polynomials of low degree. The
code used to generate this table can be downloaded from [10].
Extensive work has focused on quantifying the price of anarchy for load balancing games, i.e.,
congestion games where all action sets are singletons, i.e., Ai ⊆ E. Within this setting, and when
all resource costs are affine and identical, the price of anarchy is ≈ 2.012 [7, 36]. Our results connect
with this line of work, demonstrating that optimally tolled affine congestion games have a price of
anarchy matching this value, and are tight already within this class. Stated differently, the price of
anarchy of un-tolled and optimally tolled affine load balancing games with identical resources is the
same. We believe such statement holds true more generally and discuss this in the conclusions.
Optimal congestion-independent local tolls. Our methodology can also be exploited to derive
optimal local mechanisms under more stringent structural constraints. One such constraint, studied
in numerous settings, consists in the use of congestion-independent mechanisms, which are
attractive because of their simplicity. A linear program to compute optimal congestion-independent
local mechanisms is presented in Theorem 5.1, while the corresponding optimal prices of anarchy
for the case of polynomial congestion games are displayed in Table 1 (fifth column) and derived
in Corollary 5.2 as well as Section 5. All the results are novel, except for the case of d = 1,
which recovers [8]. We observe that the performance of congestion-independent mechanisms is
comparable with that of congestion-aware mechanisms for polynomials of low degree (d ≤ 3),
and still a good improvement over the un-tolled setup for high degree polynomials. In these
cases, congestion-independent mechanisms are not only robust and simple to implement, but also
relatively efficient.
Marginal cost tolls are worse than no tolls. In non-atomic congestion games, any Nash equilibrium
resulting from the application of the marginal contribution mechanism is optimal, i.e., it has a price
of anarchy equal to one. Corollary 6.1 shows how to utilize our approach to compute the efficiency
of the marginal cost mechanism in the atomic setup. The resulting values of the price of anarchy
are presented in the last column of Table 1 for polynomial congestion games. While the marginal
cost mechanism is the only mechanism ensuring that a Nash equilibrium is optimal (i.e., its price
of stability is one), utilizing the marginal cost mechanism on the original atomic model yields a
system inefficiency, measured by the price of anarchy, that is higher than that experienced levying
no toll at all (compare the second and last column in Table 1). In other words, the design principle
derived from the continuous-flowmodel does not carry over to the original setup. This phenomenon
manifests itself already in very simple setups, as we demonstrate in Fig. 3. We conclude by observing
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that our result differs significantly from that in [25], where the authors show that, as the number
of agents grow large, marginal cost tolls become optimal. This difference stems from the fact that,
in [25], the network structure is fixed as the number of agents grows, unlike here.
1.5 Techniques and high-level ideas
Underlying the developments presented above are a number of technical results, which stem from
the observation that, in the majority of the existing literature, the set L contains all resource
costs of the form ℓ(x) = ∑mj=1 α jbj (x) with α j ≥ 0, and given basis functions b1(·), . . . ,bm(·). This
allows us to leverage a common framework to study different classes of problems, not limited to
polynomial congestion games where the set of bases can be taken as {1,x , . . . ,xd }.
In this context, we first show in Theorem 2.1 that an optimal local tolling mechanisms is a linear
map from the set of resource costs to the set of tolls. More precisely, we show that, for every
resource cost ℓ(x) = ∑mj=1 α jbj (x), there exists an optimal local mechanism satisfying T opt(ℓ) =
T opt
(∑m
j=1 α jbj
)
=
∑m
j=1 α jT
opt(bj ), where the mechanism is obtained as a linear combination of
T opt(bj ), with the same coefficients α j used to define ℓ.2 It is worth noting that this first result allows
for a decoupling argument, whereby an optimal tolling functionT opt(bj ) can be separately computed
for each of the basis bj . The key idea underpinning the result on linearity of optimal tolls lies in
observing that any congestion game utilizing resource cost functions with coefficients α j ∈ R>0
and a possibly non-linear tolling mechanismT , can be mapped to a corresponding congestion game
where i) all coefficients α j are identical to one, ii) only the linear part of the tolling mechanism
T is used, and iii) the price of anarchy is identical to that of the original game (as the number of
resources grows). Complementary to this, our second result in Theorem 2.1 reduces the problem of
designing optimal basis tolls {T opt(bj )}mj=1 into a polynomially solvable linear program that also
returns the tight value of the optimal price of anarchy. We do so by building upon the result in [11],
which allows to tightly characterize the performance of a given linear tolling mechanism through
a linear program. We exploit this result and construct a polynomially-sized linear program that, for
a given basis bj , searches over all linear tolls to find T opt(bj ).
When the basis functions are convex and increasing (e.g., in the well-studied polynomial case),
we are able to explicitly solve the linear program and provide an analytic expression for the optimal
tolling function, as well as a semi-analytic expression for optimal price of anarchy (Theorem 3.1).
The fundamental idea consists in showing that the set of active constraints at the solution give
rise to a telescopic recursion, whereby the optimal toll to be levied when u + 1 agents are selecting
a resource can be written as a function of the optimal toll to be levied when only u agents are
present. This is the most technical part of the manuscript, and the expression of the optimal price
of anarchy reveals an unexpected connection with that for un-tolled load balancing games on
identical machines [7, 36]. While the sizes of the linear programs appearing in Theorems 2.1 and 3.1
grow (polynomially) with the number of agents n, in Section 4 we show how to design optimal
tolling mechanisms that apply to any n (possibly infinite). Our approach consists in two steps: we
first solve a linear program of finite dimension, and then extend its solution to arbitrary n.
Congestion-independent optimal local mechanisms as well as the efficiency of the marginal cost
mechanism can also be computed through linear programs (Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 6.1). In the
first case, admissible tolls basis {T opt(bj )}mj=1 are constrained to be be constant with the congestion,
while in the second case the expression for marginal cost tolls is substituted in the program. We
provide analytical solutions to these two programs for the case of polynomial congestion games.
2As word of caution, we remark that linearity of the optimal mechanism in the sense clarified above does not mean that the
corresponding tolls are linear in the congestion level, i.e., does not mean that τe (x ) = aex + be for some ae , be .
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1.6 Organization
In Section 2 we derive linear programs to compute optimal local tolling mechanisms. We also
provide optimal price of anarchy values for polynomial congestion games. In Section 3 we obtain
an explicit solution to these programs that applies when resource costs are convex and increasing.
Section 4 generalizes the previous results to arbitrarily large number of agents. In Section 5 and
Section 6 we derive congestion independent tolling mechanism and evaluate the efficiency of the
marginal cost mechanism. In these sections we also specialize the results to the polynomial case.
2 OPTIMAL TOLLING MECHANISMS
In this section we develop a methodology to compute optimal local tolling mechanisms through the
solution of tractable linear programs. To ease the notation, we introduce the set of integer triplets
I = {(x ,y, z) ∈ Z3≥0 s.t. 1 ≤ x + y + z ≤ n and either xyz = 0 or x + y + z = n}, for given n ∈ N.
Theorem 2.1. A local mechanism minimizing the price of anarchy over congestion games with n
agents, resource costs ℓ(x) = ∑mj=1 α jbj (x), α j ≥ 0, and basis functions {b1, . . . ,bm} is given by
T opt(ℓ) =
m∑
j=1
α j · τ optj , where τ optj : {1, . . . ,n} → R, τ optj (x) = f optj (x) − bj (x) (4)
and ρoptj ∈ R, f optj : {1, . . . ,n} → R solve the linear programs (one per each bj )
max
f ∈Rn, ρ ∈R
ρ
s.t. bj (x + z)(x + z) − ρbj (x + y)(x + y) + f (x + y)y − f (x + y + 1)z ≥ 0 ∀ (x ,y, z) ∈ I,
(5)
where we define bj (0) = f (0) = f (n + 1) = 0. Correspondingly, PoA(T opt) = maxj {1/ρoptj }.3 These
results are tight for pure Nash equilibria, and extend to coarse correlated equilibria.
The above statement contains two fundamental results. The first part of the statement shows
that an optimal tolling mechanism applied to the function ℓ(x) = ∑mj=1 α jbj (x) can be obtained as
the linear combination of τ optj (x), with the same coefficients α j used to define ℓ. Complementary to
this, the second part of the statement provides a practical technique to compute τ optj (x) for each
3If we require tolls to be non-negative, an optimal mechanism is as in (4), where we set τ optj (x ) = f
opt
j (x ) · PoAopt − bj (x ).
Review of Tolling in Congestion Games. The scientific interest
in the design of tolls can be traced back to (20). Since then,
a large body of literature in the areas of transportation and
computer science has investigated this approach (21–24).
In this respect, the continuous-flow approximation of Rosen-
thal’s original model is by far the most well understood, as
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed, greatly sim-
plifying the analysis. In this setting, Pigouvian tolls produce
an emergent behavior which is always optimal (20, 28).
With regard to the original congestion game model, much
less is known as observed, e.g., by (29), in part due to the
multiplicity of equilibria. Within this setting, no tolling scheme
can incentivize optimal routing in every instance (27). Despite
the vast scientific interest in the design of tolling schemes,
there is currently no means to derive a set of optimal local
tolls, let alone being able to do so through a computationally
tractable approach. It is in fact already di cult to provide
tight e ciency bounds for a given tolling scheme, as one must
consider its performance over multiple instances. To date, the
only available answer is confined to problems where all latencies
¸e are a ne functions, and under the restrictive requirement
that each tolling function ·e is congestion-independent (25).
Tolling schemes utilizing full information have recently been
proposed for congestion games where all latencies ¸e are poly-
nomial functions of the utilization (26). Unfortunately, the
above-mentioned work requires leveraging complete network
and user information - a rather impractical scenario. In addi-
tion, the resulting taxation mechanism must be recomputed
for any change in the network topology, lacking the robustness
property one hopes for (see Fig. 2). Finally, the computation
of these tolls has complexity growing exponentially with the
number of users and size of the network, making the approach
unusable even for small-size networks. In this article we pro-
vide a computationally tractable framework to design local
tolls that maxmize the system e ciency and are robust to
modifications in the underlying routing problem.
Results
We begin introducing the formal notion of price-of-anarchy, be-
fore presenting the main result. Towards this goal, we consider
congestion games where each latency is a linear combination
of given bases bj : N æ R+, j = 1, . . . ,m, with nonnegative
coe cients. Note that this framework is extremely rich, as it
accommodates many well-studied classes of congestion games,
e.g., polynomial congestion games (30). A ne congestion
games are obtained, for example, setting b1(x) = 1, b2(x) = x.
We denote with G the set of all congestion games that can
be constructed with latency functions as in the above, and n
players. Our objective is that of designing a function that asso-
ciates each latency ¸ to a corresponding toll, which we denote
with T (¸). As discussed earlier, the ine ciency of a tolling
mechanism T is commonly measured by the price-of-anarchy,
defined as
PoA(T ) = sup
GœG
NashCost(G, T )
MinCost(G, T ) , [2]
where MinCost(G, T ) and NashCost(G, T ) are the minimum
social cost and the highest social cost at a Nash equilibrium
when employing the mechanism T on the game G. By defi-
nition PoA(T ) Ø 1, and a lower value of the price-of-anarchy
corresponds to a more e cient tolling. Within this context, the
central planner is interested in designing a mechanism T that
results in the highest possible e ciency, i.e., that minimizes
Eq. (2). The following theorem resolves this question.
Optimal Local Tolls. Let ¸ =
qm
j=1 –jbj be a latency func-
tion. A local taxation mechanism minimizing the price-of-
anarchy defined in Eq. (2) is given by
T opt(¸) =
mÿ
j=1
–j · T opt(bj), where T opt(bj) = foptj ≠ bj ,
and foptj is the solution to the following linear program,
max
fœRn,flœR
fl
s.t. bj(y)y ≠ flbj(x)x+ (x≠ z)fj(x)≠ (y ≠ z)fj(x+ 1) Ø 0
’(x, y, z) œ I.
The optimal price of anarchy is 1/flı.
The above statement contains two fundamental results.
The first part of the statement shows that an optimal taxation
mechanisms is a linear map. As a consequence, the toll applied
to any latency function ¸ =
qm
j=1 –jbj can be obtained as
the linear combination of T opt(bj), with the same coe cients
–j used to define ¸. Complementary to this, the second part
of the statement provides us with a practical technique to
compute T opt(bj) for each of the basis bj , as the solution of
a simple linear program. This is particularly valuable, as
linear programs can be solved extremely e ciently through
widely available software packages, e.g., (31, 32). Furthermore,
the approach presented allows to precompute and store in a
library the values of T opt(bj) for di erent basis functions (e.g.,
polynomials). Having done so, the only operations required
to compute an optimal toll T opt(¸) are mere addition and
multiplications of T opt(bj) - stored in the library - with –j . A
graphical representation of this process is included in figure
blah, while MATLAB® and Python® code for designing optimal
mechanisms is publicly available at [blah].
¸=
qm
j=1–jbj
b1
b2
bm
solve LP
with bm
solve LP
with b2
solve LP
with b1
...
·opt1
·opt2
·optm ◊
◊
◊
+ T
opt(¸)
–1
–2
–m
We finally observe that a di erent linear program can be
derived in order to compute (and not optimize) the e ciency
of given tolls, see supplementary material. As the un-tolled
case corresponds to setting the tolls to be identically zero, our
approach recovers and generalizes many well-known results on
the e ciency of un-tolled systems, e.g., (15, 30, 33–35), see
the first column of figure BLAH. In addition to that, it allows
to automatically discover novel e ciency bounds: for any
given choice of basis functions, the associated linear program
automatically recovers the exact value of the price of anarchy,
avoiding the need for ad hoc and complicated constructions
as those appearing in the above-cited works. Both in the
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the main result on the design of optimal tolls. The input consists of a
given latency ℓ(x) expressed as a combination of basis bj (x) with coefficie ts α j . For each basis, we compute
the associated optimal toll τ optj (x) = f
opt
j (x) − bj (x) by solving the linear program (LP) appearing in (5). The
resulting optimal t ll is obtained as the linear combination of τ optj (x) with the same coefficients α j . The
quantities τ optj (x) can be precomputed and stored in a library, offloading the solution of the linear programs.
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of the basis bj (x) as the solution of a tractable linear program. A graphical representation of this
process is included in Fig. 1, while Python/Matlab code to design optimal tolls can be found in [10].
We solved the latter linear programs for n = 100 and polynomials of maximum degree 1 ≤ d ≤ 6.
The corresponding results are displayed in Table 1, while Section 4 shows that these results hold
identically for arbitrarily large n. In the case of d = 1, the optimal price of anarchy is approximately
2.012, matching that of un-tolled load balancing games on identical machines [7, 36]. We observe
that, in this restricted setting, the price of anarchy can not be improved at all through local tolling
mechanisms. In fact, no matter what non-negative tolling mechanism we are given, we can always
construct a load balancing game on identical machines with a price of anarchy no lower than 2.012.4
Proof. We divide the proof in two parts to ease the exposition.
Part 1.We show that any local mechanismminimizing the price of anarchy over all linear local mech-
anisms, does so also over all linear and non-linear local mechanisms. We let T opt be a mechanism
that minimizes the price of anarchy over all linear local mechanisms, i.e., over all T satisfying
T
(
m∑
j=1
α jbj
)
=
m∑
j=1
α jT (bj ),
for all α j ≥ 0. We intend to show that PoA(T opt) ≤ PoA(T ) for any possibleT (linear or non-linear).
Towards this goal, assume, by contradiction, that there exists a tolling mechanism Tˆ such that
PoA(T opt) > PoA(Tˆ ). (6)
Let Gb be the class of games in which any resource e can only utilize a latency ℓe ∈ {b1, . . . ,bm}.
Since Gb ⊂ G, we have
PoA(Tˆ ) ≥ sup
G ∈Gb
NECost(G, Tˆ )
MinCost(G) . (7)
Additionally, let G(Z≥0) ⊂ G be the class of games with α j ∈ Z≥0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all
edges in E. Construct the mechanism T¯ by “linearizing” the mechanism Tˆ , i.e., as
T¯ (ℓ) = T¯
(
m∑
j=1
α jbj
)
=
m∑
j=1
α jTˆ (bj ).
We observe that the efficiency of any instanceG ∈ Gb to which the tolling mechanism Tˆ is applied,
coincides with that of an instance G ∈ G(Z≥0) to which T¯ is applied, and vice-versa. Thus,
sup
G ∈Gb
NECost(G, Tˆ )
MinCost(G) = supG ∈G(Z≥0)
NECost
(
G, T¯
)
MinCost(G) = PoA(T¯ ), (8)
where the last equality holds due to Lemma A.1. Putting together Eqs. (6) to (8) gives
PoA(T opt) > PoA(T¯ ). (9)
Since T opt minimizes the price of anarchy over all linear mechanism, and since T¯ is linear by
construction, it must be PoA(T opt) ≤ PoA(T¯ ), a contradiction of (9). Thus, T opt minimizes the price
of anarchy over any mechanism.
4To do so, it is sufficient to utilize the instance in [36, Thm 3.4], where the the latency x used therein is replaced with
x + τ (x ). The Nash equilibrium and the optimal allocation will remain unchanged, yielding the same price of anarchy value.
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Part 2.Wewill derive a linear program to design optimal linear mechanisms. Putting this together
with the claim in Part 1 will conclude the proof. Towards this goal, we will prove that anymechanism
of the form
T (ℓ) =
m∑
j=1
α jτ
opt
j with τ
opt
j (x) = λ · f optj (x) − bj (x) (10)
is optimal, regardless of the value of λ ∈ R>0. While this is slightly more general than needed,
setting λ = 1 will give the first claim. Additionally, setting λ = PoAopt will give the second claim as
this choice will ensure non-negativity of the tolls.
Before turning to the proof, we recall a result from [11] that allows us to compute the price of
anarchy for given linear taxation mechanism T (ℓ) = ∑mj=1 α jτj . Upon defining fj (x) = bj (x) + τj (x)
for all 1 ≤ x ≤ n and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the authors show that the price of anarchy of T computed
over congestion games G is identical for pure Nash and coarse correlated equilibria and is given by
PoA(T ) = 1/ρopt, where
ρopt = max
ρ ∈R,ν ∈R≥0
ρ
s.t. bj (x + z)(x + z) − ρbj (x + y)(x + y) + ν [fj (x + y)y−fj (x + y + 1)z] ≥ 0 ∀(x ,y, z) ∈ I.
(11)
We also remark that, when all functions { fj }mj=1 are non-decreasing, it is sufficient to only consider
a reduced set of constraints, following a similar argument to that in [30, Cor. 1]. In this case, the
linear program simplifies to
max
ρ ∈R,ν ∈R≥0
ρ
s.t. bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [fj (u)u − fj (u + 1)v] ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v ≤ n, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [fj (u)(n −v) − fj (u + 1)(n − u)] ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v > n, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
(12)
We now leverage (11) to prove that any mechanism in (10) is optimal, as required. Towards this
goal, we begin by observing that the optimal price of anarchy obtained when the latencies are
generated using all the basis functions {b1, . . . ,bm} is larger-equal than the optimal price of anarchy
obtained when the latencies are generated using a single basis function {bj } at a time (and therefore
is larger-equal than the highest of these optimal price of anarchy values). This follows readily
since the former class of games is a superset of the latter. Additionally, observe that a set of tolls
minimizing the price of anarchy over the games generated using a single basis function {bj } is
precisely that in (10). This is because minimizing the price of anarchy amounts to designing fj to
maximize ρ in (11), i.e., to solving the following program
max
f ∈Rn
max
ρ ∈R,ν ∈R≥0
ρ
s.t. bj (x + z)(x + z) − ρbj (x + y)(x + y) + ν [f (x + y)y−f (x + y + 1)z] ≥ 0 ∀(x ,y, z) ∈ I,
which can be equivalently written as
max
f˜ ∈Rn, ρ ∈R
ρ
s.t. bj (x + z)(x + z) − ρbj (x + y)(x + y) + f˜ (x + y)y− f˜ (x + y + 1)z ≥ 0 ∀(x ,y, z) ∈ I,
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where we defined f˜ = ν · f . While f optj is defined in (5) precisely as the solution of this last program,
resulting in a price of anarchy of 1/ρoptj , note that λ · f optj is also a solution since its price of anarchy
matches 1/ρoptj (in fact, it can be computed using (11) for which (ρ,ν ) = (ρoptj , 1/λ) are feasible).
The above reasoning shows that the optimal price of anarchy for a game with latencies generated
by {b1, . . . ,bm}must be larger-equal than maxj {1/ρoptj }. We now show that this holds with equality.
Towards this goal, we note, thanks to (11), that utilizing tolls as in (6) for a game generated by
{b1, . . . ,bm} results in a price of anarchy of 1/C∗, where C∗ is the value of (11). It is immediate to
verify that (ρ,ν ) = (maxj {ρoptj }, 1/λ) are feasible for this program for any choice of λ > 0. This
proves, as requested, that any tolling mechanism defined in (10) is optimal.
We now verify that the choice λ = PoAopt = maxj {1/ρoptj } ensures positivity of the tolls, which
is equivalent to f optj (x)−bj (x)/λ ≥ 0 for all x ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. This follows readily, as setting x = z = 0
in (5) results in the constraint f (y) − ρbj (y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Since f optj and ρoptj must
be feasible for this constraint, we have f optj (y) − ρoptj bj (y) ≥ 0. One concludes observing that
f
opt
j (y)−bj (y)/λ ≥ f optj (y)−ρoptj bj (y) ≥ 0, since λ ≥ 1/ρoptj . We conclude remarking that all results
hold for both Nash and coarse correlated equilibria, as they were derived from (11). □
3 EXPLICIT SOLUTION AND SIMPLIFIED LINEAR PROGRAM
In this section we derive a simplified linear program as well as an analytical solution to the problem
of designing optimal tolling mechanisms. We do so under the assumption that all basis functions
are positive, increasing, and convex in the discrete sense5.
Theorem 3.1. Consider congestion games with n agents, where resource costs take the form ℓ(x) =∑m
j=1 α jbj (x), α j ≥ 0, and basis bj : {1, . . . ,n} → R are positive, convex, strictly increasing.6
i) A tolling mechanism minimizing the price of anarchy is as in (4), where each f optj : {1, . . . ,n} → R
solves the following simplified linear program
ρ
opt
j = maxf ∈Rn, ρ ∈R
ρ
s.t. b(v)v − ρb(u)u + f (u)u − f (u + 1)v ≥ 0 u +v ≤ n, u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n},
b(v)v − ρb(u)u + f (u)(n − u) − f (u + 1)(n − u) ≥ 0 u +v > n, u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n},
(13)
with f (0) = f (n + 1) = 0. The corresponding optimal price of anarchy is maxj {1/ρoptj }.
ii) An explicit expression for each f optj is given by the following recursion, where f
opt
j (1) = bj (1),
f
opt
j (u + 1) = minv ∈{1, ...,n } β(u,v)f
opt
j (u) + γ (u,v) − δ (u,v)ρoptj ,
β(u,v) = min{u,n −v}min{v,n − u} , γ (u,v) =
b(v)v
min{v,n − u} , δ (u,v) =
b(u)u
min{v,n − u} ,
(14)
ρ
opt
j = min(v1, ...,vn )∈{1, ...,n }n−1×{0, ...,n }
(n −vn)
(∏n−1
u=1 βubj (1) +
∑n−2
u=1
(∏n−1
i=u+1 βi
)
γu + γn−1
)
+ b(vn)vn
(n −vn)
(∑n−2
u=1
(∏n−1
i=u+1 βi
)
δu + δn−1
)
+ b(n)n ,
(15)
where we use the short-hand notation βu instead of β(u,vu ), and similarly for γu and δu .
5We say that a scalar function f : {1, . . . , n } → R is convex if f (x + 1) − f (x ) is non-decreasing in its domain.
6The result also holds if convexity and strict increasingness of bj (x ) are weakened to strict convexity of bj (x )x and
bj (n) > bj (n − 1). One such example is that of bj (x ) = √x .
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Proof. As shown in Theorem 2.1, computing an optimal tolling mechanism amounts to utilizing
(4), where each τ optj has been designed through the solution of the program in (5). In light of this,
we prove the theorem as follows: first, we consider a simplified linear program, where only a subset
of the constraints enforced in (5) are considered. Second, we show that a solution of this simplified
program is given by (ρoptj , f optj ) as defined above. Third, we show that f optj is non-decreasing, thus
ensuring that (ρoptj , f optj ) is also feasible for the original over constrained program in (5). From this
we conclude that (ρoptj , f optj ) must also be a solution of (5), i.e., the second claim in the Theorem.
We conclude with some cosmetics, and transform the simplified linear program whose solution is
given by (ρoptj , f optj ) in (13), thus obtaining the first claim. Throughout the proof, we drop the index
j from bj as the proof can be repeated for each basis separately.
Simplified linear program. We begin rewriting the program in (5), where instead of the indices
(x ,y, z), we use the corresponding indices (u,v,x) defined as u = x + y, v = x + z. The constraint
indexed by (u,v,x) reads as b(v)v − ρb(u)u + f (u)(u − x) − f (u + 1)(v − x) ≥ 0. We now consider
only the constraints where x is set to x = min{0,u +v −n}, and u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, Such constraints
read as b(v)v − ρb(u)u + min{u,n −v} f (u) − min{v,n − u} f (u + 1) ≥ 0.7 Finally, we exclude the
constraints with v = 0, u ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1} and obtain the following simplified linear program
max
f ∈Rn, ρ ∈R
ρ
s.t. b(v)v − ρb(u)u + min{u,n −v} f (u) − min{v,n − u} f (u + 1) ≥ 0
(u,v) ∈ {0, . . . ,n} × {1, . . . ,n} ∪ (n, 0).
(16)
Proof that (ρopt, f opt) solve (16). Towards the stated goal, we begin by observing that (ρopt, f opt)
is feasible by construction. For u = 0 this follows as the tightest constraints in (16) read as
f opt(1) ≥ b(1) and we selected f opt(1) = b(1). Feasibility is immediate to verify foru ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1},
v ∈ {1, . . . ,n} as applying its definition gives f opt(u + 1) ≤ β(u,v)f opt(u) + γ (u,v) − δ (u,v)ρopt.
Using the expressions of β,γ ,δ , and rearranging gives exactly the constraint (u,v) in (16). The only
element of difficulty consists in showing that also the constraints with u = n, v ∈ {0, . . . ,n} are
satisfied. Towards this goal, we observe that utilizing the recursive definition of f opt we obtain an
expression for f opt(n) as a function of ρopt with a nested succession of minimizations, which can
be jointly extracted as follows8
f opt(n) = min
vn−1
{
· · · + min
vn−2
{
· · · + min
vn−3
{. . . }
}}
= min
vn−1
min
vn−2
min
vn−3
. . .min
v1
{. . . } .
Hence, we obtain
f opt(n) = min
(v1, ...,vn−1) ∈{1, ...,n }n−1
n−1∏
u=1
βubj (1) +
n−2∑
u=1
(
n−1∏
i=u+1
βi
)
(γu − δuρopt) + (γn−1 − δn−1ρopt)
 min
(v1, ...,vn−1)∈{1, ...,n }n−1
q(v1, . . . ,vn−1; ρopt)
The constraints we intend to verify read as b(v)v − ρb(n)n + (n − v)f opt(n) ≥ 0, and can be
equivalently written as minvn ∈{0, ...,n }[b(vn)vn − ρb(n)n + (n −vn)f opt(n)] ≥ 0. We substitute the
resulting expression of f opt(n), extract the minimization over vn as in the above, and are therefore
7Note that considering all these constraints with u, v ∈ {0, . . . , n } results precisely in (13). To see this, simply distinguish
the cases based on whether u + v ≤ n or u + v > n.
8For allu ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, by definition f opt(u+1) = minvu
[
βu minvu−1 (βu−1f opt(u − 1) − δu−1ρopt + γu−1) − δu ρopt + γu
]
.
Since βu ≥ 0, this expression simplifies to f opt(u + 1) = minvu minvu−1 βu βu−1f opt(u − 1) − (βuδu−1 + δu )ρopt +
βuγu−1 + γu . Repeating this reasoning gives the desired expression.
11
left with min(v1, ...,vn−1,vn )∈{1, ...,n }n−1×{0, ...,n }[b(vn)vn − ρb(n)n + (n −v)q(v1, . . . ,vn−1; ρopt)] ≥ 0,
which holds if and only if b(vn)vn − ρb(n)n+ (n−vn)q(v1, . . . ,vn−1; ρopt) ≥ 0 for all possible tuples
(v1, . . . ,vn). Rearranging these constraints and solving for ρopt will result in a set of inequalities on
ρopt (one inequality for each tuple). Our choice of ρopt in (15) is precisely obtained by turning the
most binding of these into an equality. This ensures that (ρopt, f opt) are feasible also when u = n.
We now prove, by contradiction, that (ρopt, f opt) is optimal. To do so, we assume that there exists
fˆ , that is feasible and achieves a higher value ρˆ > ρopt. Since ( fˆ , ρˆ) is feasible, using the constraint
with u = 0, v = 1, we have fˆ (1) ≤ b(1) = f opt(1). Observing that min{v,n − u} > 0 due to v > 0,
u < n and leveraging the constraints with u = 1 as well as the corresponding specific choice of
v = v∗1 (for given u ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1}, we let v∗u be an index v ∈ {1, . . . ,n} where the minimum in
(14) is attained), it must be that fˆ (2) satisfies
fˆ (2) ≤ b(v
∗
1)v∗1 − ρˆb(1)1 + min{1,n −v∗1} fˆ (1)
min{v∗1 ,n − 1}
<
b(v∗1)v∗1 − ρoptb(1)1 + min{1,n −v∗1} f opt(1)
min{v∗1 ,n − 1}
= f opt(2).
Here the first inequality follows by feasibility of fˆ , the second is due to ρˆ > ρopt and fˆ (1) ≤
f opt(1). The final equality follows due to the definition of f opt(2). Hence we have shown that
fˆ (2) < f opt(2). Noting that the only information we used to move from level u to u + 1 is that
ρˆ > ρopt and fˆ (u) ≤ f opt(u), one can apply this argument recursively up until u = n − 1, and
thus obtain fˆ (n) < f opt(n). Nevertheless, leveraging the constraints with u = n and v = v∗n gives
b(v∗n)v∗n − ρˆb(n)n + (n −v∗n) fˆ (n) ≥ 0, or equivalently ρˆ ≤ (b(v∗n)v∗n + (n −v∗n) fˆ (n))/(b(n)n). Thus
ρˆ ≤ b(v
∗
n)v∗n + (n −v∗n) fˆ (n)
b(n)n ≤
b(v∗n)v∗n + (n −v∗n)f opt(n)
b(n)n = ρ
opt,
where we used the fact that n − v∗n ≥ 0 and fˆ (n) < f opt(n). Note how ρˆ ≤ ρopt contradicts the
assumption ρˆ > ρopt, thus concluding this part of the proof.
Proof that f opt is non-decreasing. By contradiction, let us assume f opt is decreasing at some index.
Lemma A.2 in the Appendix shows that, if this is the case, then f opt continues to decrease, so that
f opt(n) ≤ f opt(n − 1). Note that it must be f opt(n) > 0, as if it were f opt(n) ≤ 0, then by definition
of ρopt we would have
ρopt = min
v ∈{0, ...,n }
b(v)v + (n −v)f opt(n)
nb(n) =
0 + f opt(n)
b(n) ≤ 0,
since the minimum is attained at the lowest feasible v due to b(v)v and −v f opt(n) non-decreasing
and increasing, respectively. This is a contradiction as the price of anarchy is bounded already in the
un-tolled setup.9 It must therefore be that the price of anarchy is bounded also when optimal tolls
are used. Additionally, as we have removed a number of constraints from the linear program, the
corresponding price of anarchy will be even lower. Therefore it must be that 1/ρopt is non-negative
and bounded, so that ρopt > 0 contradicting the last equation.
9To see this, consider the linear program used to determine the price of anarchy in the un-tolled case, i.e., (12) where we set
fj (x ) = bj (x ). When ν = 1, it is always possible to find ρ > 0, so that the corresponding price of anarchy is bounded.
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Thus, in the following we proceed with the case of f opt(n) > 0. It must be that
ρopt = min
v ∈{0, ...,n }
b(v)v + (n −v)f opt(n)
nb(n) ≤ minv ∈{1, ...,n }
b(v)v + (n −v)f opt(n)
nb(n)
≤ min
v ∈{1, ...,n }
b(v)v + (n −v)f opt(n − 1)
nb(n) ,
where the first inequality holds as we are restricting the domain of minimization, the second
because f opt(n) ≤ f opt(n − 1) and n − v ≥ 0. Let us observe that f opt(n) is defined as f (n) =
minv ∈{1, ...,n }[b(v)v + (n −v)f opt(n − 1)] − ρopt(n − 1)b(n − 1). Substituting minv ∈{1, ...,n }[b(v)v +
(n −v)f opt(n − 1)] = f opt(n) + ρopt(n − 1)b(n − 1) in the former bound on ρopt, we get
ρopt ≤ f
opt(n) + ρopt(n − 1)b(n − 1)
nb(n) =⇒ ρ
opt ≤ f
opt(n)
nb(n) − (n − 1)b(n − 1) .
We want to prove that this gives rise to a contradiction. To do so, we will show that
f opt(n)
nb(n) − (n − 1)b(n − 1) < minv ∈{0, ...,n }
b(v)v + (n −v)f opt(n)
nb(n) . (17)
As a matter of fact, if the latter inequality holds true, the proof is immediately concluded as
ρopt ≤ f
opt(n)
nb(n) − (n − 1)b(n − 1) < minv ∈{0, ...,n }
b(v)v + (n −v)f opt(n)
nb(n) = ρ
opt =⇒ ρopt < ρopt,
where the first inequality has been showed above, the second is what remains to be proved, and
the latter equality is by definition. Therefore, we are left to show (17), which holds if we can show
that ∀v ∈ {0, . . . ,n} it is
д(v)  h(v) + (n −v)f
opt(n)
h(n) −
f opt(n)
h(n) − h(n − 1) > 0,
where h : R → R≥0 is a function such that h(v) = b(v)v for v ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,n}. We choose h to
be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex; one such function always
exists.10 We first consider the point v = 0. Observe that д(0) > 0 when n > 1 as
д(0) = f
opt(n)
b(n) −
f opt(n)
nb(n) − (n − 1)b(n − 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ f
opt(n)[(n − 1)b(n) − (n − 1)b(n − 1)] > 0,
which holds as f opt(n) > 0, n > 1, and b(n) > b(n − 1) strictly.
If д′(v) ≥ 0 atv = 0, the proof is complete as д is convex and due to д′(0) ≥ 0 it is non-decreasing
for any v ≥ 0 so that the constraint will be satisfied for all v ≥ 0.
If this is not the case, then д′(0) < 0, which we consider now. Note that, at the point v = n − 1,
the derivative д′(n − 1) = [h′(n − 1) − f opt(n)]/h(n) satisfies
h(n)д′(n − 1) = h′(n − 1) − f opt(n) ≥ h′(n − 1) − (h(n − 1) − h(n − 2)) ≥ 0
where the last inequality is due to convexity, while the first inequality holds as f opt(n) ≤ h(n − 1) −
h(n − 2) thanks to Lemma A.2 and n ≥ 2.11 Therefore since д′(0) < 0, д′(n − 1) ≥ 0 and д convex,
there must exist an unconstrained minimizer v∗ ∈ (0,n − 1]. We will guarantee that д(v∗) > 0 so
10Observe that the function b(v)v is positive, strictly increasing, and strictly convex in the discrete sense in its domain due
to the assumptions.
11In fact, either n is the first index starting from which f opt decreases (i.e. f opt(n) < f opt(n − 1)) in which case f opt(n) ≤
ρopt[b(n − 1)(n − 1) −b(n − 2)(n − 2)] ≤ b(n − 1)(n − 1) −b(n − 2)(n − 2) due to ρopt ≤ 1, or the function starts decreasing
at a u + 1 < n in which case Lemma A.2 also shows that
f opt(n) ≤ · · · ≤ f opt(u + 1) ≤ ρopt[b(u)u −b(u − 1)(u − 1)] ≤ b(u)u −b(u − 1)(u − 1) ≤ b(n − 1)(n − 1) −b(n − 2)(n − 2),
where the inequalities hold due to ρopt ≤ 1 and the convexity of b(u)u .
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that for any (real and thus integer) v ∈ [0,n] it is д(v) > 0. The unconstrained minimizer satisfies
f opt(n) = h′(v∗), which we substitute, and are thus left with proving the final inequality
h(v∗) + (n −v)h′(v∗)
h(n) −
h′(v∗)
h(n) − h(n − 1) > 0
⇐⇒ [h(n) − h(n − 1)]h(v∗) > h′(v∗)[(n −v∗)(h(n − 1) − h(n)) + h(n)],
bearing in mind that 0 < v∗ ≤ n − 1. As the left hand side is positive due to h increasing and
v∗ > 0, the inequality holds trivially if the right hand side is less or equal to zero, i.e., if h(n) ≤
(n −v∗)(h(n) − h(n − 1)). In the other case, when (n −v∗)(h(n − 1) − h(n)) + h(n) > 0, we leverage
the fact that h′(v∗) < (h(n) − h(v∗))/(n −v∗) by strict convexity of h(x) in x = v∗ > 0, so that
h′(v∗)[(n −v∗)(h(n − 1) − h(n)) + h(n)] < h(n) − h(v
∗)
n −v [(n −v
∗)(h(n − 1) − h(n)) + h(n)]
=
h(n)
n −v∗ [h(n) − h(v
∗)] + [h(n) − h(n − 1)][h(v∗) − h(n)]
=
h(n)
n −v∗ [h(n) − h(v
∗)] − [h(n) − h(n − 1)]h(n) + [h(n) − h(n − 1)]h(v∗) ≤ [h(n) − h(n − 1)]h(v∗),
where the last inequality follows from h(n)−h(v
∗)
n−v∗ ≤ h(n) − h(n − 1), which holds for 0 < v∗ ≤ n − 1
by convexity. This concludes this part of the proof.
Proof that (ρopt, f opt) is feasible also for (5) and final cosmetics. Recall from the first part of the proof
that the constraints in (5) can be equivalently written as b(v)v − ρb(u)u + f (u)(u − v) + (f (u) −
f (u + 1))z ≥ 0. Since f opt is non-decreasing, following the argument in [30, Cor. 1] one verifies
that the tightest constraints are obtained when z is as large as possible, that is z = min{u,n −v}.
These constraints are already included in our simplified program of (16), with the exception of
those with v = 0 and u ∈ {0, . . . ,n − 1} which we have removed. To show that also these holds,
we fix 0 ≤ u ≤ n − 1 and note that the constraint with v = 0 reads as u f opt(u) ≥ ρoptvb(v), and is
trivially satisfied for u = 0. Let us now consider the corresponding constraint with v = 1
b(1)1 − ρb(u)u + u f opt(u) − f opt(u + 1) ≥ 0.
Since f opt is non-decreasing as shown in previous point then f opt(u + 1) ≥ f opt(1) = b(1). Hence,
0 ≤ b(1)1 − ρb(u)u + u f opt(u) − f opt(u + 1) ≤ b(1)1 − ρoptb(u)u + u f opt(u) − b(1).
Thus, from the left and right hand sides we obtain the desired result u f opt(u) ≥ ρoptub(u).
We conclude with some cosmetics: the simplified linear program in (16) is almost identical to
that in (13), except for the constraints with v = 0 and u ∈ {0, . . . ,n − 1}, which we have removed
in (16). Nevertheless, we have just verified that an optimal solution does satisfy these constraints
too. Hence, we simply add them back to obtain (13). □
4 OPTIMAL TOLLING MECHANISMS FOR ARBITRARY NUMBER OF AGENTS
While the linear programming formulations introduced in (5) and (13) provide an optimal tolling
mechanism and the corresponding optimal price of anarchy when the number of agents is upper-
bounded by n (finite), in this section we show how to design optimal tolling mechanisms for
polynomial congestion games that apply to any n (possibly infinite), by solving a linear program of
fixed size. The resulting values of the price of anarchy are those already displayed in Table 1.
For ease of exposition, we consider congestion games where the set of resource costs is produced
by non-negative combinations of a single polynomial xd , d ≥ 1 at a time. This is without loss
of generality, as one can derive optimal tolling mechanisms for polynomial congestion games
with maximum degree d , i.e., generated by {1,x , . . . ,xd }, simply repeating the ensuing reasoning
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separately for all polynomials of degree higher than one and lower-equal to d . No toll need to be
applied to polynomials of order zero as the corresponding price of anarchy is one.
The idea we leverage is as follows: first, we solve a linear program of fixed size n¯, from which we
obtain a set of tolls that are then extended analytically to any number of agents. This produces a
mechanism for which we are able to quantify the corresponding price of anarchy over games with
possibly infinitely many agents. Such price of anarchy value is an upper bound on the true optimal
price of anarchy over games with possibly infinitely many agents, as the mechanism we design is
not necessarily optimal. At the same time, we solve the linear program in (13), and thus obtain the
optimal price of anarchy for games with a maximum of n¯ agents. The latter is a lower bound for
the optimal price of anarchy over games with possibly infinitely many agents. Letting n¯ grow, the
upper bound matches the lower bound already for small values of n¯, as showcased in Table 2.
While the construction of the lower bound follows readily by solving the linear program in
(13) with n¯ agents, in the following we describe the procedure to derive the upper bound. More
specifically, we clarify i) what program of dimension n¯ we solve; ii) how we extend its solution
from n¯ to infinity; and iii) how we compute the resulting price of anarchy over games with possibly
infinitely many agents. In the remainder of this section, we will always select n¯ finite and even. As
for the first point, we consider the following linear program
max
f ∈Rn¯, ρ ∈R
ρ
s.t. vd+1 − ρud+1 + f (u)u − f (u + 1)v ≥ 0 u +v ≤ n¯, u,v ∈ {0, . . . , n¯}
vd+1 − ρud+1 + f (u)(n¯ −v) − f (u + 1)(n¯ − u) ≥ 0 u +v > n¯, u,v ∈ {0, . . . , n¯}
f (u) ≤ ud u ∈ {1, . . . , n¯}
f (u) ≥ f (u − 1) u ∈ {2, . . . , n¯}
(18)
with the usual convention that f (0) = f (n¯ + 1) = 0. Note that the previous program is identical to
that in (13) with b(x) = xd , except that we have included two additional sets of constraints. We let
(f opt, ρopt) be a solution of this program and utilize it to define f ∞ : N→ R as follows
f ∞(x) =
{
f opt(x) for x ≤ n¯/2
β · xd for x > n¯/2 , where β =
f opt(n¯/2)
(n¯/2)d . (19)
Informally, the idea is to extend τ∞(x) = f ∞(x) − b(x) from n¯/2 to infinity with a polynomial of
the same order of the original xd . Note that β ≥ 012 is chosen so that the two expressions defining
f ∞ match for x = n¯/2. While the expression of f ∞ and all forthcoming quantities depends on the
choice of n¯, we do not make this explicit to ease the notation. Lemma A.3 in the Appendix ensures
that the price of anarchy of f ∞ is identical for pure Nash and coarse correlated equilibria, and is
upper bounded over games with possibly infinitely many agents by 1/ρ∞, where ρ∞ is given by
the following expression
ρ∞ = min
{
ρopt, β − d
(
1 + 2
n¯
)d+1 ( β
d + 1
)1+ 1d }
.
As clarified above this represents an upper bound on the optimal price of anarchy. The upper
and lower bounds displayed in Table 2 have been computed according to the procedure just
described, and demonstrate that, for a relatively small n¯ = 40, the mechanism obtained from
12Observe that f ∞(1) ≥ 0 since having f ∞(1) < 0 would always result in a lower performance, as shown in [30]. Therefore
f ∞(n¯/2) ≥ 0 as it is feasible for (18), which includes the constraint f (x + 1) ≥ f (x ). Hence, β ≥ 0.
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n¯ d = 1 d = 2 d = 3
LB UB LB UB LB UB
10 2.011 825 2.038 237 5.097 187 5.316 382 15.530 175 17.138 429
20 2.012 067 2.019 844 5.100 974 5.147 543 15.550 847 15.751 993
30 2.012 067 2.014 335 5.100 974 5.119 149 15.550 852 15.684 195
40 2.012 067 2.012 067 5.100 974 5.100 974 15.550 852 15.550 859
Table 2. Lower and upper bounds (LB and UB) on the values of the optimal price of anarchy for polynomial
congestion games with arbitrarily large number of agents and d = 1, 2, 3. The LB vs UB shows how the tolls
derived from f ∞ defined in (19) are approximately optimal up the fifth decimal digit when we select n¯ = 40.
f ∞ is approximately optimal up to the fifth decimal digit for polynomial congestion games with
d = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, we observe that the tolling mechanism T∞(αℓ) = αT∞(ℓ) = ατ∞, where τ∞(x) =
f ∞(x) − b(x) might not satisfy τ∞(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ N (i.e., they might be monetary incentives
and not tolls). Nevertheless, multiplying f ∞ with a factor γ > 0 produces tolls γ f ∞(x) − b(x)
with identical price of anarchy (the proof of Lemma A.3 will hold with ν = 1/γ in place of ν = 1).
Therefore, one simply needs to consider tolls of the formγ f ∞(x)−b(x), whereγ is chosen sufficiently
large to ensure that γ f ∞(x) −b(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ N; one such γ always exists. When multiple basis
are present, we select γ as a common scaling factor to ensure non-negativity of all tolls basis.
5 CONGESTION-INDEPENDENT TOLLING MECHANISMS
In this section we provide a general methodology to compute optimal congestion-independent local
tolling mechanisms for games generated by {b1, . . . ,bm}. We also specialize the result to polynomial
congestion games providing explicit expressions for the tolls and the corresponding price of anarchy.
In this section we consider basis functions that are convex in the discrete sense (see Footnote 5).
Theorem 5.1. A local congestion-independent mechanism minimizing the price of anarchy over
congestion games with n agents, and resource costs ℓ(x) = ∑mj=1 α jbj (x), α j ≥ 0, with convex13 positive
non-decreasing basis functions {b1, . . . ,bm} is given by
T opt(ℓ) =
m∑
j=1
α j · τ optj , where τ optj ∈ R, τ optj =
(
1
νopt
− 1
)
bj (1) (20)
and ρopt ∈ R, νopt ∈ R≥0 solve the linear program
max
ρ ∈R,ν ∈[0,1]
ρ
s.t. bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [bj (u)u − bj (u + 1)v] + bj (1)(1 − ν )(u −v) ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v ≤ n, u ≥ v, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [bj (u)(n −v) − bj (u + 1)(n − u)] + bj (1)(1 − ν )(u −v) ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v > n, u ≥ v, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(21)
where we define bj (0) = bj (n + 1) = 0. Correspondingly, PoA(T opt) = 1/ρopt, and the optimal tolls are
non-negative. The result is tight for pure Nash equilibria and extends to coarse correlated equilibria.
The optimal price of anarchy arising from the solution of (21) for polynomials of order at most
d = 1, 2, . . . , 6 and n = 100 are shown in the fifth column of Table 1. Before proceeding with proving
the theorem, we specialize its result to polynomial congestion games with d ≥ 2 and arbitrarily
large n. This allows us to derive explicit expressions matching the values featured in Table 1 and
13The result also holds if convexity of bj (x ) is weakened to convexity of bj (x )x . One example is that of bj (x ) = √x .
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holding for arbitrarily large n. We do not study the case of d = 1 as this has been analyzed in [8],
resulting in an optimal price of anarchy of 1 + 2/√3 ≈ 2.15, which we also recover through the
solution of the linear program above.
Corollary 5.2. Consider polynomial congestion games of maximum degree d = 2 and arbitrarily
large number of agents, i.e., congestion game where the cost on resource e is ℓe (x) = αex2 + βex + γe ,
with non-negative αe , βe ,γe . An optimal congestion-independent mechanism satisfies
T opt(ℓe ) = 3αe , PoA(T opt) = 163 ≈ 5.33. (22)
The result is tight for pure Nash equilibria and extends to coarse correlated equilibria.
Following a similar line of reasoning to that of Corollary 5.2 (see the next page for its proof), it is
possible to derive an expression for the optimal price of anarchy with constant tolls also in the
case of 3 ≤ d ≤ 6, i.e.,
PoA(T opt) = u¯(u¯ + 1)
d+1 − u¯d+1[u¯ + (u¯ + 2)d ] + (u¯ + 1)2d+1 − (u¯ + 1)d+1
u¯(u¯ + 1)((u¯ + 1)d − u¯d ) + (u¯ + 1)d+1 − u¯(u¯ + 2)d − 1 , (23)
where u¯ is the floor of the unique real positive solution to ud+1 − (u + 1)d + 1 −u = 0. For example,
d = 3 =⇒ u¯ = 2, PoA(T opt) = 2 · 3
4 − 24 · (2 + 43) + 37 − 34
2 · 3 · (33 − 23) + 34 − 2 · 43 − 1 =
1212
66 ≈ 18.36.
Similarly, with d = 4, . . . , 6, it is, respectively, PoA(T opt) = 111588/1248 ≈ 89.41, PoA(T opt) =
1922184/4092 ≈ 469.74, PoA(T opt) = 32963196/9912 ≈ 3325.58, matching the values in Table 1.
While we do not formally prove the expression (23) in the interest of conciseness, the key idea
consists in observing that the two most binding constraints appearing in the linear program of
Theorem 5.1 are those obtained with (u,v) = (u¯, 1) and (u,v) = (u¯+1, 1). Turning the corresponding
inequalities into equalities and solving for ρ and ν gives the result in (23).
We now turn focus on proving Theorem 5.1, followed by Corollary 5.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The fact that optimal local congestion-independent tolls are linear in
the sense that T opt(ℓ) = T opt(∑mj=1 α jbj ) = ∑mj=1 α jT opt(bj ) can be proven following the same steps
of Theorem 2.1. Therefore it suffices to determine the best linear local congestion-independent
toll. Towards this goal, we observe that the price of anarchy of a given linear local constant toll
T (∑mj=1 α jbj ) = ∑mj=1 α jτj , τj ∈ R≥0 can be determined as the solution of the following program,
which applies, thanks to (12), since fj (x) = bj (x) + τj is non-decreasing
max
ρ ∈R,ν ∈R≥0
ρ
s.t. bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [(bj (u) + τj )u − (bj (u + 1) + τj )v] ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v ≤ n, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [(bj (u) + τj )(n −v) − (bj (u + 1) + τj )(n − u)] ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v > n, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
(24)
We also recall that (24) tightly characterizes the price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria, and the
corresponding bound extends to coarse correlated equilibria. Determining the best non-negative
toll amounts to letting (τ1, . . . ,τm) ∈ Rm≥0 be decision variables, over which we need to maximize.
While this would result in a bi-linear program, we define σ = (σ1, . . . ,σm) ∈ Rm≥0 with σj = ντj ,
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and consider the following linear program
max
ρ ∈R,ν ∈R≥0,σ ∈Rm≥0
ρ
s.t. bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [bj (u)u − bj (u + 1)v] + σj (u −v) ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v ≤ n, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [bj (u)(n −v) − bj (u + 1)(n − u)] + σj (u −v) ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v > n, , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(25)
which is an exact reformulation of (24), except for the fact that we are not including the (non-linear)
constraint requiring σj = 0 whenever ν = 0. We will rectify this at the end by showing that νopt > 0.
Lemma A.5 in the Appendix leverages the fact that the basis functions are convex, positive,
non-decreasing by assumption, so that only the constraints with u ≥ v,u ≥ 1 and (u,v) = (0, 1)
need to be accounted for in (25). Due to the fact that u − v ≥ 0 for u ≥ 1, in order to maximize
ρ, we choose σj as large as possible. Observing that the only upper bound on σj arises from the
choice of (u,v) = (0, 1) and reads as σj ≤ (1 − ν )bj (1), we set σj = (1 − ν )bj (1), and translate the
constraint σj ≥ 0 into ν ≤ 1, thus obtaining (21). To conclude we are left to show that νopt solving
(21) is non-zero. Towards this goal, we observe that solving the program for a fixed choice of ν = 0
would result in ρ = b(1)/b(n) (the tightest constraint is (u,v) = (n, 0)), while an arbitrarily small
but positive ν would give a strictly higher ρ.
Once νopt is determined, the optimal tolls can be derived from νoptτ optj = (1−νopt)bj (1), recalling
that νopt > 0, thus yielding (20). Non-negativity of the tolls follow from the fact that we impose
ν ≤ 1 so that τ optj =
(
1/νopt − 1) bj (1) ≥ 0 □
We now focus on Corollary 5.2. In proving this result, we deliberately follow a different approach
other than directly applying the linear program in Theorem 5.1, with the hope of providing the
reader with an independent perspective on the problem.
Proof of Corollary 5.2. We prove the claim in two steps. First, we show that the price of
anarchy for any fixed toll is lower-bounded by 16/3, when considering pure Nash equilibria.
Second, we show that the price of anarchy obtained with T opt is upper-bounded by 16/3 for both
Nash and coarse correlated equilibria.
For the lower bound, it suffices to consider resource costs of the form ℓe (x) = αex2, whereby
any constant linear tolling mechanisms takes the form T (ℓe ) = αeτ , for some scalar τ ≥ 0. For any
τ ≥ 3 we consider the following problem instance: there are 8 agents each with two actions anei
and aopti . In action anei , user i selects 6 of the available 8 resources, which are associated to c1x2/8;
in aopti user i selects the remaining two resources with costs c1x2/8, as well as one resource with
cost c2x2/8 (we will fix c1 and c2 at a later stage). Each player has a similar pair of actions, but each
subsequent agent is offset by one from the prior user, as depicted in Fig. 2. In this game, the system
and user costs read as follows
SC(ane) = 6(c1b(6)) = 216c1, SC(aopt) = 2c1b(2) + c2b(1) = 8c1 + c2,
Ci (ane) = 6c1(b(6) + τ ) = 216c1 + 6c1τ , Ci (aopti ,ane−i ) = 2c1(49 + τ ) + c2(1 + τ ).
(26)
We normalize the costs in the game setting SC(ane) = 1, which results in c1 = 1/216 from
(26). To ensure that the joint action ane is a Nash equilibrium (at least weakly), we impose that
Ci (ane) = Ci (aopti ,ane−i ) for any player i . This condition is satisfied when c2 = (2τ + 59)/108(1 + τ )
Hence, the price of anarchy in this game is lower-bounded by SC(ane)/SC(aopt) = 1/SC(aopt) =
1/(8c1 + c2). This expression is larger-equal to 16/3 for any choice of τ ≥ 3 (in particular, equal
when we set τ = 3), where we have utilized the values of c2 from above and c1 = 1/216.
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For τ < 3 we construct a game with similar features. There are 3 users each with actions anei and
a
opt
i . In action anei , user i selects 2 of the 3 available resources featuring a cost c1x2/3; in aopti they
select the remaining resource with cost c1x2/3, as well as one resource with cost c2x3/3. Each user
has a similar pair of actions, but each subsequent agent is offset by one from the prior (see Fig. 2).
In this game, we obtain the following system and user costs:
SC(ane) = 2(c1b(2)) = 8c1, SC(aopt) = c1b(1) + c2b(1) = c1 + c2
Ci (ane) = 2c1(b(2) + τ ) = 8c1 + 2c1τ , Ci (aopti ,ane−i ) = c1(9 + τ ) + c2(1 + τ ).
As in the previous example, we set SC(ane) = 1 implying c1 = 1/8. To ensure that the joint action
ane is a Nash equilibrium, we impose that Ci (ane) = Ci (aopti ,ane−i ) for any player i , resulting in
c2 = (τ − 1)/8(1 + τ ). The resulting price of anarchy is lower-bounded by 1/SC(aopt) = 1/(c1 + c2).
This quantity is larger-equal than 16/3 for any choice of τ < 3.
Finally, for the fixed toll τ = 3, we upper-bound the price of anarchy at 16/3. For ease of
presentation, we first consider the case where the cost on resource e is ℓe (x) = αex2 for some
αe ≥ 0. We will show at the end how to extend this result to the case of ℓe (x) = αex2 + βex + γe .
Towards this goal, let ane (resp. aopt) be an equilibrium (resp. optimum) allocation in a congestion
game G, with n users, edges in e ∈ E. The cost at equilibrium satisfies
SC(ane) ≤
n∑
i=1
Ci (aopti ,ane−i ) −
n∑
i=1
Ci (ane) + SC(ane) (27)
=
∑
e ∈E
αe
[
ze ((xe + ye + 1)2 + τ ) − ye ((xe + ye )2 + τ ) + (xe + ye )3
]
(28)
≤
∑
e ∈E
αe [(xe + ze )((xe + ye + 1)2 + 3) − (xe + ye )((xe + ye )2 + 3) + (xe + ye )3] (29)
=
∑
e ∈E
αe
[
3((xe + ze ) − (xe + ye )) + (xe + ze )(xe + ye + 1)2
]
≤
∑
e ∈E
αe
[
4(xe + ze )3 + 14 (xe + ye )
3
]
= 4SC(aopt) + 14SC(a
ne), (30)
Incentivizing e￿icient use of shared infrastructure:
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For   < 3 we construct a game with similar features. There are 3 users each with actions anei and
a
opt
i . In action anei , user i selects 2 of the 3 available resources featuring a cost c1x /3; in aopti they
select the remaining resource with cost c1x2/3, as well as one resource with cost c2x3/3. Each user
has a similar pair of actions, but each subsequent agent is o￿set by one from the prior (see Fig. 2).
In this game, we obtain the following system and user costs:
SC(ane) = 2(c1b(2)) = 8c1, SC(aopt) = c1b(1) + c2b(1) = c1 + c2
Ci (ane) = 2c1(b(2) +   ) = 8c1 + 2c1  , Ci (aopti ,ane i ) = c1(9 +   ) + c2(1 +   ).
As in the previous exa ple, we set SC(ane) = 1 implying c1 = 1/8. T ensure that the joint action
ane is a Nash equilibrium, we impos th t Ci (ane) = Ci (aopti ,ane i ) for any player i , resulting in
c2 = (    1)/8(1 +   ). The resulting price of anarchy is lower-bounded by 1/SC(aopt) = 1/(c1 + c2).
This quantity is larger-equal than 16/3 for any choice of   < 3.
Finally, for the ￿xed toll   = 3, we upper-bound the price of anarchy at 16/3. For ease of
presentation, we ￿rst consider the case where the cost on resource e is `e (x) =  ex2 for some
 e   0. We will show at the end how to extend this result to the case of `e (x) =  ex2 +  ex +  e .
Towards this goal, let ane (resp. aopt) be an equilibrium (resp. optimum) allocation in a congestion
game G, with n users, edges in e 2 E. The cost at equilibrium satis￿es
SC(ane) 
n’
i=1
Ci (aopti ,ane i )  
n’
i=1
Ci (ane) + SC(ane) (27)
=
’
e 2E
 e
⇥
ze ((xe +  e + 1)2 +   )    e ((xe +  e )2 +   ) + (xe +  e )3
⇤
(28)

’
e 2E
 e [(xe + ze )((xe +  e + 1)2 + 3)   (xe +  e )((xe +  e )2 + 3) + (xe +  e )3] (29)
=
’
e 2E
 e
⇥
3((xe + ze )   (xe +  e )) + (xe + ze )(xe +  e )2
⇤

’
e 2E
 e

4(xe + ze )3 + 14 (xe +  e )
3
 
= 4SC(aopt) + 14S ( (30)
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Fig. 2. Game construction used to lower bound the price of anarchy for quadratic congestion games with
fixed tolls     3 (le￿) and   < 3 (right). On the le￿ (resp. right), the available actions of two of the eight (resp.
three) agents are shown. The solid red shape contains the resources utilized by the first user in the action
ane1 , while the solid blue shape contains the resources utilized by the first user in the action a
opt
1 . User 2 has
similar actions but rotated clockwise on each circle by one resource. Each of the remaining agents’ actions
are defined similarly by rotating about the apparent ’ring’.
Fig. 2. Game construction used to lower bound the price of anarchy for quadratic congestion games with
fixed tolls τ ≥ 3 (left) and τ < 3 (right). On the left (resp. right), the available actions of two of the eight (resp.
three) agents are shown. The solid red shape contains the resources utilized by the first user in the action
ane1 , while the solid blue shape c ntains the resou es utiliz d by the first user in the ction
opt
1 . User 2 has
similar act ons but rotated clockwise n each circl by o e resource. Each of the remaining agents’ actions
are defined similarly by rotating about the apparent ’ring’.
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whereye = |ane |e−xe , ze = |aopt |e−xe , and xe = |{i ∈ N s.t. e ∈ anei ∩aopti }|. Observe that (27) holds
from the definition of Nash equilibrium, while (28) follows from the parameterization introduced
in [30], and substituting be (x) = x2. Equation (29) follows by replacing τ = 3 and by xe ≥ 0. To see
that (30) holds for all integers xe ,ye ≥ 0, we define u = xe + ye ≥ 0, v = xe + ze ≥ 0, and divide
the argument in two parts depending on whether the integer tuple (u,v) ∈ {u ≥ 22 or v ≥ 8} or
not. For the case of (u,v) ∈ {u ≥ 22 or v ≥ 8}, we observe that 4v3 + 14u3 − 3v + 3u −v(u + 1)2 ≥
4v3 + 14u
3 −v(u2 + 2u + 4) ≥ 4v3 + 14u3 −v(u + 2)2, and therefore we are left to prove
4v3 + 14u
3 −v(u + 2)2 ≥ 0 (31)
For every fixed u ≥ 0, differentiating with respect to v shows that the left hand side of (31) has a
unique global minimum in the positive orthant at v = (u + 2)/√12. For any u > 22, this minimum
satisfies (31), thus for any v ≥ 0 and u > 22 (31) is satisfied. Additionally observe that, when v = 8,
(31) is satisfied for each u ∈ {0, . . . , 22}. Further, for fixed 0 ≤ u ≤ 22, the left hand side of (31)
is increasing in v for v ≥ 8. This implies that (31) holds for every v ≥ 8 as well. Therefore (31)
(and consequently (30)) is satisfied for all (u,v) ∈ {u ≥ 22 or v ≥ 8}. One can enumerate the
finitely-many non-negative integers (u,v) with u < 22, v < 8 and verify that (30) holds.
The inequality in (30) implies that the price of anarchy is upper bounded by 41−1/4 = 16/3 when
resource costs take the form ℓe (x) = αex2 for some αe ≥ 0. Observe that this bound holds for
arbitrarily large n and matches the solution of the linear program, stated in Table 1. We now
generalize this result to ℓe (x) = αex2 + βex + γe , where αe , βe and γe are non-negative. To do so,
we start from (27), and note that (28) now contains the sum of three contributions: contributions
relative to αe , contributions relative to βe and contributions relative to γe . Hence, it suffices to
prove the following two additional inequalities to complete the reasoning, that is∑
e ∈E
βe
[
ze (xe + ye + 1) − ye (xe + ye ) + (xe + ye )2
] ≤ ∑
e ∈E
βe
[
4(xe + ze )2 + 14 (xe + ye )
2
]
, (32)∑
e ∈E
γe [ze − ye + xe + ye ] ≤
∑
e ∈E
γe
[
4(xe + ze ) + 14 (xe + ye )
]
, (33)
where we recall that no toll is associated to the presence of βe or γe in (22). Summing these two
inequalities with the inequality from (28) and (30) will, in fact, yield the desired claim. While the
proof of (33) is immediate, the argument used to show (32) is similar to that following (28). In fact,
sincexe ≥ 0, we have ze (xe+ye+1)−ye (xe+ye )+(xe+ye )2 ≤ (xe+ze )(xe+ye+1)−(xe+ye )2+(xe+ye )2.
Thus, we are left to show that for every non-negative integer u and v it is 4v2 + 14u
2 −v − uv ≥ 0,
where we make use of the same coordinates introduced earlier. This inequality is satisfied by all non-
negative integer points since 4v2 + 14u
2 −v −uv ≥ 0 describes the region outside an ellipse located
in the (u,v) plane entirely on the left of the lineu = 1 and entirely south of the linev = 1, where the
inequality is trivially satisfied for u = v = 0. Finally, we observe that the technique used to bound
the price of anarchy extends to coarse correlated equilibria due to linearity of the expectation. □
6 (IN)EFFICIENCY OF THE MARGINAL COST MECHANISM
In this section we study the efficiency of the marginal cost mechanism, whereby the toll imposed
to each user corresponds to her marginal contribution to the system cost. In the atomic setup, the
marginal cost mechanism takes the form T p(ℓ) = τ p, and the corresponding tolls read τ p(x) =
(x − 1)(ℓ(x) − ℓ(x − 1)), where we set ℓ(0) = 0. We recall that T p is the only mechanism ensuring
that the best performing equilibrium is optimal, i.e., it minimizes the system cost (1). The following
Corollary shows how to compute PoA(T p) through the solution of a linear program when basis
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are discrete convex (see Footnote 5). We also provide the analytical expression of PoA(T p) for
polynomial congestion games with d = 1, and note that a similar argument carries over when d ≥ 1.
Corollary 6.1. The price of anarchy of the marginal cost mechanism T p(ℓ) = τ p, with τ p(x) =
(x − 1)(ℓ(x) − ℓ(x − 1)) over congestion games with n agents, and resource costs generated by a
non-negative linear combination of convex14 basis functions {b1, . . . ,bm} equals 1/ρopt, where ρopt
solves the following linear program
max
ρ ∈R,ν ∈R≥0
ρ
s.t. bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [(u2 − uv)bj (u) − u(u − 1)bj (u − 1) −v(u + 1)bj (u + 1)] ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v ≤ n, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [ubj (u)(2n − u −v) + (u − 1)bj (u − 1)(v − n) + (u + 1)bj (u + 1)(u − n)] ≥ 0
u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, u +v > n, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
where we set bj (−1) = bj (0) = bj (n + 1) = 0.
For affine congestion games with arbitrarily large number of agents, we have PoA(T p) = 3. Both
results are tight for pure Nash equilibria, and also hold for coarse correlated equilibria.
Proof. We begin with the first claim, and observe that the marginal cost mechanism is linear,
in the sense that T p(∑mj=1 α jbj ) = ∑mj=1 α jT p(bj ) for all non-negative α j and for all basis functions.
Additionally, the functions fj (x) = bj (x) + (x − 1)(bj (x) − bj (x − 1)) are non-decreasing in their
domain. This is because
fj (x + 1) − fj (x) = bj (x + 1) + x(bj (x + 1) − bj (x)) − bj (x) − (x − 1)(bj (x) − bj (x − 1))
= (x + 1)bj (x + 1) − xbj (x) − (xbj (x) − (x − 1)bj (x − 1)) ≥ 0,
for all x ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1}, where the inequality holds as each function bj (x)x is convex (since each
bj (x) is so), and thus its discrete derivative is non-decreasing. It follows that the price of anarchy can
be computed using the linear program in (12) which provides tight results for pure Nash equilibria
that extend to coarse correlated equilibria. Substituting fj (x) = bj (x) + (x − 1)(bj (x) − bj (x − 1)) in
(12) we obtain the desired result.
We now turn the attention to affine congestion games, and prove that PoA(T p) = 3. Towards
this goal, we start by observing that Fig. 3 is an example of an affine congestion game using
the marginal cost mechanism and n = 2 agents. Thus, we conclude that PoA(T p) ≥ 3 for affine
14The result also holds under the weaker requirement that only bj (x )x are convex.
O1
O2
D
x
x
x x
x x
Nash routing, τe (x ) = 0
(A) System Cost: 2
O1
O2
D
x
x
x x
x x
Nash routing, τ pe (x ) = x − 1
(B) System cost: 6
Fig. 3. Instance used to demonstrates that the price of anarchy associated to the marginal cost toll mechanism
is at least 3 in affine congestion games. Two users are willing to travel from O1/O2 to D, where each edge
features a latency ℓe (x) = x . In the un-tolled case (A) the system cost at the worst Nash-equilibrium is 2. The
situation worsens when using marginal cost tolls (B), as the worst Nash equilibrium gives a system cost of 6.
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congestion games and pure Nash equilibria. We now show that PoA(T p) ≤ 3 whenever the each
resource e is associated to a cost ℓe (x) = αex + βe . In this case, we have T p(ℓe ) = τ p, where
τ p(x) = αe (x − 1) is independent of βe , thanks to its definition. For an equilibrium allocation
ane ∈ A and aopt ∈ A and optimal allocation, we have
SC(ane) ≤
n∑
i=1
Ci(aopti , ane−i ) −
n∑
i=1
Ci(ane) + SC(ane)
=
∑
e ∈E
αe
[
ze (2xe + 2ye + 1) − ye (2xe + 2ye − 1) + (xe + ye )2
]
+ βe [ze − ye + (xe + ye )]
≤
∑
e ∈E
αe
[(xe + ye ) − (xe + ye )2 + 2(xe + ye )(xe + ze ) + (xe + ze )] + βe [xe + ze ]
≤
∑
e ∈E
αe
[
3(xe + ze )2
]
+ βe [3(xe + ze )] = 3 · SC(aopt),
where we utilize the notationye = |ane |e −xe , ze = |aopt |e −xe , and xe = |{i ∈ N s.t. e ∈ anei ∩aopti }|.
The first inequality holds by definition of Nash equilibrium, and the second holds due to non-
negativity of xe and αe . One verifies that the last inequality holds, using u = xe + ye ≥ 0, v =
xe + ze ≥ 0, and observing that the region 3v2 + u2 − u − 2uv − v ≥ 0 is the exterior of an
ellipse containing all (u,v) ∈ Z2≥0. We remark that the latter reasoning extends identical to coarse
correlated equilibria exploiting linearity of the expectation. Rearranging the above inequality, we
get PoA(T p) ≤ SC(ane)/SC(aopt) ≤ 3 for pure Nash as well as coarse correlated equilibria. □
7 CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
This work derives optimal local tolling mechanisms and corresponding prices of anarchy for atomic
congestion games. We do so for both the setup where tolls are congestion-aware and congestion-
independent. Finally, we derive price of anarchy values for the marginal cost mechanism. Our
results generalize those of [8], and show that the efficiency of optimal tolls utilizing solely local
information is comparable to that of existing tolls using global information [6]. Further, we show
that utilizing the marginal cost mechanism on the atomic setup is worse than levying no toll.
Open questions. Our work leaves a number of open questions, two of which are discussed next.
- While we observed that the price of anarchy for optimally tolled affine congestion games
matches that of affine load balancing games on identical machines, we conjecture such result
holds more generally, at least for polynomial congestion games.
- In this manuscript we focused on the worst-case efficiency metric both with respect to the
game instance, and the resulting equilibrium. It is currently unclear if, and to what extent,
optimizing the price of anarchy impacts other more optimistic performance metrics.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Results used in Section 2
Lemma A.1. Consider the class of congestion games G. For any linear tolling mechanism T , it is
PoA(T ) = sup
G ∈G(Z≥0)
NECost(G,T )
MinCost(G) ,
where G(Z≥0) ⊂ G is the subclass of games with α j ∈ Z≥0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all edges in E.
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Proof. We divide the proof in two steps. First, we show that
PoA(T ) = sup
G ∈G(Q≥0)
NECost(G,T )
MinCost(G) , (34)
where G(Q≥0) ⊂ G is the subclass of games with α j ∈ Q≥0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all edges in E.
Towards this goal, observe that (34) holds trivially with ≥ in place of the equality sign, asR≥0 ⊃ Q≥0.
To show that the converse inequality also holds, observe that the price of anarchy of a given linear
mechanismsT (computed over all meaningful instances where NECost(G,T ) > 0) can be computed
utilizing the linear program reported in (11). By strong duality, we have PoA(T ) = 1/C∗, where C∗
is the value of the dual program of (11), i.e.,
C∗ = min
θ (x,y,z, j)
∑
x,y,z, j
bj (x + z)(x + z)θ (x ,y, z, j) (35)
s.t.
∑
x,y,z, j
[
fj (x + y)y − fj (x + y + 1)z
]
θ (x ,y, z, j) ≤ 0 (36)∑
x,y,z, j
bj (x + y)(x + y)θ (x ,y, z, j) = 1 (37)
θ (x ,y, z, j) ≥ 0 ∀(x ,y, z, j) ∈ I, (38)
where we define bj (0) = fj (0) = fj (n + 1) = 0 for convenience, I = {(x ,y, z, j) ∈ Z4≥0 s.t. 1 ≤
x +y+z ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, and the minimum is intended over the entire tuple {θ (x ,y, z, j)}(x,y,z, j)∈I .
Let {θ ∗(x ,y, z, j)}(x,y,z, j)∈I denote an optimal solution (which exists, due to the non-emptiness and
boundedness of the constraint set, which can be proven using the same argument in [30, Thm. 2]).
If all θ ∗(x ,y, z, j) are rational, then consider the gameG defined as follows. For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
and for every (x ,y, z, j) ∈ I, we create an edge identified with e(x ,y, z, j, i), and assign to it the
latency α jbj , where α j = θ ∗(x ,y, z, j)/n. The gameG features n players, where player p ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
can either select the edges in the allocation aoptp or in anep , defined by
a
opt
p = ∪ni=1 ∪mj=1 {e(x ,y, z, j, i) : x + y ≥ 1 + ((i − p)modn)},
anep = ∪ni=1 ∪mj=1 {e(x ,y, z, j, i) : x + z ≥ 1 + ((i − p + z)modn)}.
Note that the above construction is an extension of that appearing in [30] to the case of multiple
basis functions. Since G has
NECost(G,T ) =
∑
x,y,z, j
bj (x + y)(x + y)θ (x ,y, z, j) = 1,
MinCost(G) ≤
∑
x,y,z, j
bj (x + z)(x + z)θ (x ,y, z, j) = C∗,
(see [30, Thm. 2] for this), its price of anarchy is larger-equal to 1/C∗. Observe that G features only
non-negative rational latencies’ coefficients (i.e., G ∈ G(Q≥0)), therefore (34) follows readily.
If at least one entry in the tuple {θ ∗(x ,y, z, j)}(x,y,z, j)∈I is not rational, we will prove the existence
of a sequence of games Gk ∈ G(Q≥0) whose worst-case efficiency converges to PoA(T ) as k →∞.
This would imply that (34) holds with ≤ in place of the equality sign, concluding the proof. To do
so, let us consider the set
S = {{θ (x ,y, z, j)}(x,y,z, j)∈I s.t. (36) and (38) hold}.
Observe that S is non-empty, and that for any tuple belonging to S , we can find a sequence of non-
negative rational tuples {{θk (a,x ,b, j)}(x,y,z, j)∈I}∞k=1 (i.e., θk (a,x ,b, j) ∈ Q≥0 for all a,x ,b, j and k),
that converges to it. Let {{θk (a,x ,b, j)}(x,y,z, j)∈I}∞k=1 be one such sequence of tuples converging to
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{θ ∗(a,x ,b, j)}(x,y,z, j)∈I , which belongs to S . For each tuple {θk (a,x ,b, j)}(x,y,z, j)∈I in the sequence,
define the gameGk following the same construction introduced above with θk (a,x ,b, j) in place of
θ ∗(a,x ,b, j). Following the same reasoning as above, it is NECost(Gk ,T ) = ∑x,y,z, j bj (x + y)(x +
y)θk (x ,y, z, j), and MinCost(Gk ) ≤ ∑x,y,z, j bj (x + z)(x + z)θk (x ,y, z, j). Therefore
PoAk = NECost(G
k ,T )
MinCost(Gk ) ≥
∑
x,y,z, j bj (x + y)(x + y)θk (x ,y, z, j)∑
x,y,z, j bj (x + z)(x + z)θk (x ,y, z, j)
,
from which we conclude that
lim
k→∞
PoAk ≥ lim
k→∞
∑
x,y,z, j bj (x + y)(x + y)θk (x ,y, z, j)∑
x,y,z, j bj (x + z)(x + z)θk (x ,y, z, j)
=
∑
x,y,z, j bj (x + y)(x + y)θ ∗(x ,y, z, j)∑
x,y,z, j bj (x + z)(x + z)θ ∗(x ,y, z, j)
=
1
C∗
,
as θk (a,x ,b, j) → θ ∗(a,x ,b, j) for k →∞. This completes the first step. The second and final step
consist in showing that
sup
G ∈G(Q≥0)
NECost(G,T )
MinCost(G) = supG ∈G(Z≥0)
NECost(G,T )
MinCost(G) .
Towards this goal, for any given game from the above-defined sequence Gk ∈ G(Q≥0), let dGk
denote the lowest common denominator among the latency function coefficients α j , across all
the edges of the game. Define αˆ j = α j · dGk ∈ Z≥0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all edges in E. Since
the tolling mechanisms T is linear by assumption, the equilibrium conditions are independent to
uniform scaling of the latency functions and tolls by the coefficient dGk . Therefore any game in the
sequence Gk with tolling mechanism T and latency coefficients {α j }mj=1 has the same worst-case
equilibrium efficiency as a game Gˆk which is identical to Gk except that it has latency coefficients
{αˆ j }mj=1. Observing that Gˆk belongs to G(Z≥0) concludes the proof. □
A.2 Results used in Section 3
Lemma A.2. Let b : N→ R≥0 be a nondecreasing, convex function, and let 0 < ρ ≤ 1 be a given
parameter. Further, define the function f : {1, . . . ,n} → R such that f (1) = b(1) and
f (u + 1) := min
vu ∈{1, ...,n }
min{u,n −vu } · f (u) − b(u)u · ρ + b(vu )vu
min{vu ,n − u} , (39)
for all u ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1}. Then, for the lowest value 1 ≤ uˆ ≤ n − 1 such that f (uˆ + 1) < f (uˆ), it must
hold that f (u + 1) < f (u) for all u ∈ {uˆ, . . . ,n − 1}.
Proof. The proof is presented in two parts as follows: in part (i), we identify inequalities given
that f (uˆ + 1) < f (uˆ), for 1 ≤ uˆ ≤ n − 1 as defined in the claim; and, in part (ii), we use a recursive
argument to prove that f (u + 1) < f (u) holds for all uˆ + 1 ≤ u ≤ n − 1, using the inequalities
derived in part (i).
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Part (i).We define v∗u as one of the arguments that minimize the right-hand side of (39) for each
u ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1}. By assumption, it must hold that f (uˆ + 1) < f (uˆ), which implies that
f (uˆ) > min
v ∈{1, ...,n }
min{uˆ,n −v}
min{v,n − uˆ} f (uˆ) −
b(uˆ)uˆ
min{v,n − uˆ} ρ +
b(v)v
min{v,n − uˆ}
= min
v ∈{1, ...,n }
min{uˆ − 1,n −v}
min{v,n − uˆ + 1} f (uˆ − 1) −
b(uˆ − 1)(uˆ − 1)
min{v,n − uˆ + 1} ρ +
b(v)v
min{v,n − uˆ + 1}
+
min{uˆ,n −v}
min{v,n − uˆ} f (uˆ) −
min{uˆ − 1,n −v}
min{v,n − uˆ + 1} f (uˆ − 1) −
b(uˆ)uˆ
min{v,n − uˆ} ρ
+
b(uˆ − 1)(uˆ − 1)
min{v,n − uˆ + 1} ρ +
b(v)v
min{v,n − uˆ} −
b(v)v
min{v,n − uˆ + 1} ,
where the strict inequality holds by the definition of f (uˆ + 1). Recall that
f (uˆ) := min
v ∈{1, ...,n }
min{uˆ − 1,n −v}
min{v,n − uˆ + 1} f (uˆ − 1) −
b(uˆ − 1)(uˆ − 1)
min{v,n − uˆ + 1} ρ +
b(v)v
min{v,n − uˆ + 1} .
Thus, if v∗uˆ ≤ n − uˆ, the above strict inequality with f (uˆ) can only be satisfied if
f (uˆ + 1) < f (uˆ) ≤ uˆ f (uˆ) − (uˆ − 1)f (uˆ − 1) < [b(uˆ)uˆ − b(uˆ − 1)(uˆ − 1)] · ρ.
Similarly, if v∗uˆ ≥ n − uˆ + 1, then it must hold that
(n −v∗uˆ )
[
f (uˆ)
n − uˆ −
f (uˆ − 1)
n − uˆ + 1
]
+
[
1
n − uˆ −
1
n − uˆ + 1
]
b(v∗uˆ )v∗uˆ <
[
b(uˆ)uˆ
n − uˆ −
b(uˆ − 1)(uˆ − 1)
n − uˆ + 1
]
· ρ
=⇒
[
1
n − uˆ −
1
n − uˆ + 1
]
[(n −v∗uˆ )f (uˆ) + b(v∗uˆ )v∗uˆ ] <
[
b(uˆ)uˆ
n − uˆ −
b(uˆ − 1)(uˆ − 1)
n − uˆ + 1
]
· ρ
⇐⇒ f (uˆ + 1) < [b(uˆ)uˆ − b(uˆ − 1)(uˆ − 1)]ρ,
where the first line implies the second line because f (uˆ) ≥ f (uˆ − 1), by the definition of uˆ in the
claim, and the second line is equivalent to the third by the definitions of f (uˆ + 1) and v∗uˆ . This
concludes part (i) of the proof.
Part (ii). In this part of the proof, we show by recursion that if f (uˆ+1) < f (uˆ), then f (u+1) < f (u)
for all u ∈ {uˆ + 1, ...,n − 1}. We do so by showing that, if f (u) < f (u − 1) < · · · < f (uˆ + 1) for any
u ∈ {uˆ + 1, . . . ,n − 1}, then it must hold that f (u + 1) < f (u). Thus, in the following reasoning, we
assume that u ∈ {uˆ + 1, . . . ,n − 1}, and that f (u) < f (u − 1) < · · · < f (uˆ + 1).
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We begin with the case of v∗u−1 < n − u + 1, which gives us that v∗u−1 ≤ n − u. Observe that
f (u + 1) := min
vu ∈{1, ...,n }
min{u,n −vu }
min{vu ,n − u} f (u + 1) −
b(u)u
min{vu ,n − u} ρ +
b(vu )vu
min{vu ,n − u}
= min
vu ∈{1, ...,n }
min{u − 1,n −vu }
min{vu ,n − u + 1} f (u − 1) −
b(u − 1)(u − 1)
min{vu ,n − u + 1} ρ +
b(vu )vu
min{vu ,n − u + 1}
+
min{u,n −vu }
min{vu ,n − u} f (u + 1) −
min{u − 1,n −vu }
min{vu ,n − u + 1} f (u − 1) −
b(u)u
min{vu ,n − u} ρ
+
b(u − 1)(u − 1)
min{vu ,n − u + 1} ρ +
b(vu )vu
min{vu ,n − u} −
b(vu )vu
min{vu ,n − u + 1}
≤ f (u) + u
v∗u−1
f (u) − u − 1
v∗u−1
f (u − 1) − b(u)u − b(u − 1)(u − 1)
v∗u−1
ρ
< f (u) + 1
v∗u−1
f (uˆ + 1) − 1
v∗u−1
[b(u)u − b(u − 1)(u − 1)]ρ
< f (u),
where the first inequality holds by evaluating the minimization at vu = v∗u−1, the second inequality
holds because f (u) < f (u − 1) and f (u) ≤ f (uˆ + 1), by assumption, and the final inequality holds
by the result showed in part (i) and because b(·) is nondecreasing and convex.
Next, we consider the scenario in which v∗u−1 > n − u + 1. Observe that
f (u + 1) ≤ f (u) + (n −v∗u−1)
[
f (u)
n − u −
f (u − 1)
n − u + 1
]
+
[
1
n − u −
1
n − u + 1
]
b(v∗u−1)v∗u−1
− b(u)u
n − u ρ +
b(u − 1)(u − 1)
n − u + 1 ρ
< f (u) +
[
1
n − u −
1
n − u + 1
]
[(n −v∗u−1)f (u − 1) + b(v∗u−1)v∗u−1]
− b(u)u
n − u ρ +
b(u − 1)(u − 1)
n − u + 1 ρ
= f (u) +
[
1
n − u −
1
n − u + 1
]
[(n − u + 1)f (u) + b(u − 1)(u − 1)ρ]
− b(u)u
n − u ρ +
b(u − 1)(u − 1)
n − u + 1 ρ
≤ f (u) + 1
n − u f (uˆ + 1) −
1
n − u [b(u)u − b(u − 1)(u − 1)]ρ
< f (u),
where the first inequality holds by evaluating the minimization at vu = v∗u−1, the second inequality
holds because f (u) < f (u − 1), by assumption, the equality holds by the definitions of f (u) and
v∗u−1, the third inequality holds because f (u) ≤ f (uˆ + 1), by assumption, and the final inequality
holds by the identity we showed in part (i) and because b is nondecreasing and convex.
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Finally, we consider the scenario in which v∗u−1 = n − u + 1. Observe that
f (u + 1) ≤ f (u) + u − 1
n − u f (u) −
u − 1
n − u + 1 f (u − 1) −
b(u)u
n − u ρ +
b(u − 1)(u − 1)
n − u + 1 ρ
+
[
1
n − u −
1
n − u + 1
]
b(n − u + 1)(n − u + 1)
< f (u) +
[
1
n − u −
1
n − u + 1
]
[(n −v∗u−1)f (u − 1) + b(v∗u−1)v∗u−1]
− b(u)u
n − u ρ +
b(u − 1)(u − 1)
n − u + 1 ρ
< f (u),
where the first inequality holds by evaluating the minimization at vu = v∗u−1, the second inequality
holds because f (u) < f (u − 1), by assumption, and the final inequality holds by the same reasoning
as for v∗u−1 > n − u + 1. □
A.3 Results used in Section 4
Lemma A.3. For given d ≥ 1, consider the linear program defined in (18), and let (f opt, ρopt) be
a solution. Further let f ∞ be defined in (19) utilizing (f opt, ρopt). The price of anarchy of f ∞ over
congestion games of degree d with possibly infinitely many agents is upper bounded by 1/ρ∞, where
ρ∞ = min
{
ρopt, β − d
(
1 + 2
n¯
)d+1 ( β
d + 1
)1+ 1d }
.
This result is tight for pure Nash equilibria and holds for coarse correlated equilibria too.
Proof. Since f ∞ is non-decreasing by construction, we characterize its performance over games
with a maximum of n agents through the linear program in (24) with b(x) = xd , that is
max
ρ ∈R,ν ∈R≥0
ρ
s.t. b(v)v − ρb(u)u + ν [f ∞(u)u − f ∞(u + 1)v] ≥ 0 u +v ≤ n, u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}
b(v)v − ρb(u)u + ν [f ∞(u)(n −v) − f ∞(u + 1)(n − u)] ≥ 0 u +v > n, u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n}.
(40)
Upper bounding the price of anarchy of f ∞ amounts to finding a feasible solution to this linear
program; the challenging task is that we intend to do so for n arbitrary large. We claim that
(ρ,ν ) = (ρ∞, 1) is feasible for any (possibly infinite) n, so that the claimed upper bound on the
price of anarchy follows. To prove this, we divide the discussion in two parts as the expressions are
different for u +v ≤ n and u +v > n. Before doing so, we study the degenerate case of u = 0, for
which the constraints reduce to f ∞(1) ≤ 1, which holds as f ∞ is feasible for the linear program in
(18) which already includes this constraint.
– Case of u +v ≤ n, u ≥ 1. The constraints read as
vd+1 − ρud+1 + ν [u f ∞(u) −v f ∞(u + 1)] ≥ 0 (41)
which we want to hold for any integers u ≥ 1, v ≥ 0 (the bound on the indices u +v ≤ n can
be dropped as we are interested in the case of arbitrary n).
• In the region where 0 ≤ v ≤ u, 1 ≤ u < n¯/2 (region A in Fig. 4) these constraints certainly
hold with ρ ≤ ρopt, ν = 1. This follows because f ∞(u) = f opt(u) when u ≤ n¯/2, and f opt is
feasible for the program in (18) which includes these constraints.
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Fig. 4. Regions A, B, and C utilized in proof for the case u +v ≤ n.
• In the region where v > u, 1 ≤ u < n¯/2 (region B in Fig. 4) these constraints also hold with
ρ ≤ ρopt, ν = 1 thanks to Lemma A.4 part a).
• We are left with the region where u ≥ n¯/2, v ≥ 0 (region C in Fig. 4). In this case,
f ∞(u) = β · ud by definition. With the choice of ν = 1, the constraints in (41) read
vd+1 − ρud+1 + βud+1 − βv(u + 1)d ≥ 0. (42)
Observe that, for a fixed choice of integer u ≥ n¯/2, the left hand side of (42) is a convex
function of v for v ≥ 0. Its corresponding minimum value over the non-negative reals is(
β
d + 1
)1+ 1d
(u + 1)d+1 − β
(
β
d + 1
) 1
d
(u + 1)d+1 + (β − ρ)ud+1.
Hence, (42) is satisfied for a fixed choice of u ≥ n¯/2 and all integers v ≥ 0 if the latter
expression is non-negative. Simple algebra shows that this is the case if
ρ ≤ β − d
(
1 + 1
u
)d+1 ( β
d + 1
)1+ 1d
. (43)
Since we would like (42) to hold for all u ≥ n¯/2, and since the right-hand side in (43) is
increasing in n, it suffices to ask for (43) to hold at the lowest admissible u, i.e. u = n¯/2.
Therefore, in order for (42) to be satisfied for any u ≥ n¯/2, it suffices to select
ρ ≤ β − d
(
1 + 2
n¯
)d+1 ( β
d + 1
)1+ 1d
. (44)
– Case of u + v > n, u ≥ 1. Lemma A.4 part b) shows that the constraints corresponding to
u +v > n are satisfied for arbitrary n with the choice of ν = 1, and ρ as in (44) thanks to the
fact that f ∞ : N→ R is non-decreasing.
In conclusion, we verified that (ρ,ν ) = (ρ∞, 1) is feasible for the program in (40). It follows that the
price of anarchy of f ∞ over games with arbitrarily large n is upper bounded as in the claim. □
Lemma A.4.
a) Let f : {1, . . . ,n} → R, ρ ≥ 0, and f (x) ≤ xd for all 1 ≤ x ≤ n and d ≥ 1. The constraints
vd+1 − ρud+1 + u f (u) −v f (u + 1) ≥ 0 obtained for any v ∈ N, v ≥ u, u ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1} are
satisfied if the same inequality holds for all v = u ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1}.
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b) Let f : N→ R be non-decreasing, d ≥ 1, ρ ≥ 0. If the constraintsvd+1−ρud+1+u f (u)−v f (u+
1) ≥ 0 hold for all non-negative integersu,v , thenvd+1−ρud+1+(n−v)f (u)−(n−u)f (u+1) ≥ 0
hold for all non-negative integers u,v with u +v > n, for any choice of n ≥ 1 integer.
Proof. First claim: forv = u the constraints of interest reduces to ρud+1 ≤ ud+1+u(f (u)− f (u +
1)),while forv = u+p (withp ≥ 1) the constraint reads as ρud+1 ≤ (u+p)d+1+u f (u)−(u+p)f (u+1).
Proving the claim amounts to showing
ud+1 +u(f (u)− f (u +1)) ≤ (u +p)d+1 +u f (u)− (u +p)f (u +1) ⇐⇒ f (u +1) ≤ (u + p)
d+1 − ud+1
p
for p ≥ 1. The right hand side is minimized at p = 1 (it describes the slope of the secant to
the function ud+1 at abscissas u and u + p) due to the convexity of ud+1. Therefore, it suffices to
ensure that f (u + 1) ≤ (u + 1)d+1 − ud+1 for any choice of u ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1}. By assumption,
f (u + 1) ≤ (u + 1)d , so that we can equivalently prove (u + 1)d ≤ (u + 1)d+1 −ud+1. The latter holds,
as required, for all u ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1} since
(u + 1)d ≤ (u + 1)d+1 − ud+1 ⇐⇒ (u + 1)d ≤ (u + 1)d (u + 1) − ud+1 ⇐⇒ ud ≤ (u + 1)d .
Second claim: by assumption, for all non-negative integers u,v it is ρud+1 ≤ vd+1 + u f (u) −
v f (u + 1), while we intend to show that for all non-negative integers u,v with u + v > n it is
ρud+1 ≤ vd+1 + (n −v)f (u) − (n − u)f (u + 1), regardless for the choice of n ≥ 1 integer. Proving
this is equivalent to showing
u f (u) −v f (u + 1) ≤ (n −v)f (u) − (n − u)f (u + 1) ⇐⇒ (u +v − n)(f (u) − f (u + 1)) ≤ 0,
which holds, as required, due to the fact that u +v − n > 0 and f (u) − f (u + 1) ≤ 0 due to f being
non-decreasing. □
A.4 Results used in Section 5
Lemma A.5. Let n ∈ N, and assume that the basis functions {b1, . . . ,bm}, bj : N→ R are convex
(in the discrete sense), positive, and non-decreasing, for all j = 1, . . . ,m. Then, the constraints appearing
in (25) with u = 0, v = {1, . . . ,n} are satisfied if the constraint with (u,v) = (0, 1) holds. Similarly,
the constraints with u ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, v ∈ {0, . . . ,n} and u < v are satisfied if the constraints with
u ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, v ∈ {0, . . . ,n} and u ≥ v hold.
Proof. We begin with the constraints obtained foru = 0, which read asbj (v)v−νbj (1)v−σjv ≥ 0.
The constraint with v = 0 holds trivially, while the tightest constraint for v > 0 is obtained with
v = 1 due to the fact that bj (v)v is increasing for v > 0. This shows that it is sufficient to consider
the constraint with (u,v) = (0, 1).
We now consider the constraints obtained foru ≥ 1 and divide the proof in three parts, according
to the regions in Fig. 5.
• In the region where v > u and u +v ≤ n (Region A in Fig. 5), we show that if the constraint
obtained with v = u holds, then the constraints with v > u also hold. Note that feasible
values of ν are upper bounded by ν ≤ 1. This is because the constraint with (u,v) = (0, 1)
reads as (1 − ν )bj (1) ≥ σj , and since σj ≥ 0, bj (1) > 0, every feasible ν must satisfy 1 − ν ≥ 0.
The constraint with v = u + p, p ≥ 1 read as bj (u + p)(u + p) − ρbj (u)u + ν [bj (u)u − bj (u +
1)(u+p)]−σjp ≥ 0, the tightest of which is obtained for the largest feasible value of σj , that is
σj = (1−ν )bj (1). The constraint withv = u reads asubj (u)−ρubj (u)+νu(bj (u)−bj (u+1)) ≥ 0.
Therefore, we intend to show that for every ρ and 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1 satisfying
ubj (u) − ρubj (u) + νu(bj (u) − bj (u + 1)) ≥ 0, it also holds for all p ≥ 1 that
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Fig. 5. Regions A, B, and C utilized in proof of Lemma A.5.
bj (u + p)(u + p) − ρbj (u)u + ν [bj (u)u − bj (u + 1)(u + p)] − (1 − ν )bj (1)p ≥ 0.
Since both constraints describe straight lines in the plane (ν , ρ), it suffices to verify that this
is true at the extreme points ν = 0 and ν = 1.
When ν = 0 the constraint with v = u and v = u + p read as ρbj (u)u ≤ bj (u)u, and
ρbj (u)u ≤ bj (u + p)(u + p) − bj (1)p. We therefore intend to show that
bj (u)u ≤ bj (u + p)(u + p) − bj (1)p ⇐⇒
bj (u + p)(u + p) − ubj (u)
p
≥ bj (1), (45)
which holds since bj (u)u is convex and bj (u) is non-decreasing so that bj (u+p)(u+p)−ubj (u)p ≥
bj (u + 1)(u + 1) − ubj (u) ≥ bj (u + 1) ≥ bj (1). When ν = 1, following a similar reasoning,
we are left to show that ubj (u) ≤ bj (u + p)(u + p) − pbj (u + 1), which holds thanks to the
non-decreasingness of bj (u), indeed bj (u + p)(u + p) − pbj (u + 1) ≥ bj (u + p)u ≥ bj (u)u.
• In the region wherev > u, u +v ≥ n and u ≤ n/2 (Region B in Fig. 5), we intend to show that
the following constraints holdbj (v)v−ρbj (u)u+ν [bj (u)(n−v)−bj (u+1)(n−u)]+σj (u−v) ≥ 0.
We do so by observing that the proof of the previous point did not require at all thatu+v ≤ n.
Therefore, exploiting the same proof, we have bj (v)v − ρbj (u)u + ν [bj (u)u − bj (u + 1)v] +
σj (u −v) ≥ 0 also for u +v ≥ n, i.e., in the region B of interest. We exploit this to conclude,
and, in particular, we show that the satisfaction of latter constraint implies the desired result.
Towards this goal we need to show that, for u +v > n it is
bj (u)(n −v) − bj (u + 1)(n − u) ≥ bj (u)u − bj (u + 1)v ⇐⇒ (bj (u) − bj (u + 1))(n − u −v) ≥ 0,
which holds due to the non-decreasingness of bj and to u +v > n.
• In the region where v > u, u + v ≥ n and u > n/2 (Region C in Fig. 5), we use the same
approach of that in the first point. In particular, we intend to show that the when the
constraints with v = u hold, also the constraints with v > u do so. Following a similar
reasoning as in the above, this amount to showing for every ρ and 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1 satisfying
bj (u)u − ρbj (u)u + ν (n − u)(bj (u) − bj (u + 1)) ≥ 0, it also holds for all p ≥ 1 that
bj (u + p)(u + p) − ρbj (u)u + ν [bj (u)(n − u − p) − bj (u + 1)(n − u)] − (1 − ν )bj (1)p ≥ 0.
Since both constraints describe straight lines in the plane (ν , ρ), it suffices to verify that
this is true at the extreme points ν = 0 and ν = 1. When ν = 0 we are left with bj (u)u ≤
bj (u +p)(u +p) −bj (1)p, which we already proved in (45). When ν = 1, we need to show that
bj (u + p)(u + p) − pbj (u) ≥ ubj (u), which holds by non-decreasingness of bj .
□
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